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jurisdictional Statement
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of UDOT. The order was certified as final under rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the order is at Addendum A. This
court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
Statement of the Issue
Schroeder Investments, L.C. filed a condemnation action to widen an
easement for the construction of a public road to access a storage facility
Schroeder intends to build on its adjacent parcel. At the time Schroeder filed its
action, the property subject to the easement was owned by Clyde and Linda
Edwards. During the lawsuit, UDOT purchased the property and defended
against the condemnation action on the ground that it planned to use the
property for a drainage ditch and detention pond, a public use UDOT claimed
was more necessary than Schroeder's planned public road.
Schroeder argued that the court need not compare the relative necessity of
the two proposed uses because they are compatible under Utah's compatible use
doctrine, i.e., the road and the pond may be built alongside each other on the
property. When UDOT claimed that the detention pond would extend over the
easement, Schroeder offered to give UDOT a portion of its adjacent parcel to
permit the construction of a modified detention pond, thereby allowing both
public uses and maximizing the public use of the property.
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1

In the district court, UDOT conceded that it could modify its detention
pond to accommodate Schroeder's use without compromising UDOT's use or
incurring additional expense: "that won't cost, it won't delay, we can
accomplish this/' (R.T.1 687:30.) UDOT instead argued that (i) the compatible use
doctrine applied only if Schroeder's planned use is the same as UDOTs use, i.e.,
a detention pond; and (ii) UDOT need not do anything to make the uses
compatible, even if Schroeder offered to compensate any related expenses. The
district court agreed with UDOT and entered judgment in favor of UDOT.
Issue I: Whether the district court erred in interpreting Utah's compatible
use doctrine when it declared that two uses for real property are not compatible
after the parties stipulated that altering their uses was feasible and would make
them compatible, and the condemning party offered to compensate the other
party for any expenses associated with alterations.
Standard of Review: A district court's interpretation of a common law
doctrine is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of
Ellis, 2007 UT 77f 1 6,169 P.3d 441; see also Statev.Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741
(Utah 1997) ("A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a
question of law which we review for correctness."). While the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of UDOT, it also made findings of fact after
a hearing on the motion at which the parties proffered testimony. (R.T. 687.)

1

"R.T." refers to the transcripts that are part of the record on appeal.
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i

Those findings are not at issue on appeal. First, the findings of fact are not
relevant because the district court applied the incorrect legal standard. (R.T.
687:41.) Second, UDOT conceded that its detention pond could be altered
without compromising its proposed use and that Schroeder offered to
compensate UDOT for any expenses related to repositioning its pond. (R.T.
687:30.) For that reason, the opening brief presents a pure legal question of
whether Utah's compatible use doctrine applies in light of UDOT's concessions. 2
Preservation: The summary judgment proceedings in the district court
focused on the scope and application of Utah's compatible use doctrine. (R.T.
687:4, 27-30,40-42.) Thus, Schroeder preserved the issue of whether Schroeder's
use of the property is compatible with UDOTs use.
Determinative Provisions
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B:
Utah Const, art. I, § 22
Utah Code § 78B-6-501 to -504
The following cases are at Addendum C:
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P.
172 (Utah 1918);
Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735
(Utah 1901)
2

Schroeder does not concede that findings of fact were appropriate in
adjudicating UDOTs motion for summary judgment. While the parties
proffered evidence at the hearing, Schroeder never agreed to convert the hearing
into a bench trial. But it makes no difference. For the same reason the findings
of fact are irrelevant, the evidence the district court failed to construe in the light
most favorable to Schroeder is irrelevant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Schroeder filed a condemnation action seeking to widen an easement to

construct a public road to a storage facility to be built on its adjacent parcel.
(R. 1-8.) UDOT moved for summary judgment on the ground that UDOT's use
of the property —a drainage ditch and detention pond next to 1-15 for a highway
project—was the "more necessary public use." (R. 352.)
Schroeder opposed UDOTs motion on the ground that the "more
necessary public use" doctrine is inapplicable because the two uses are
compatible or easily could be made compatible. (R. 385; R.T. 687:27-29.) To
ensure the uses were compatible, Schroeder offered to give UDOT some adjacent
land so that the public road and the detention pond could coexist and not
overlap. (R.T. 687:22-23.) UDOT refused, even though it conceded that, with the
adjacent land, it could build its detention pond without any additional cost to
UDOT: "that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this." (R.T. 687:30.)
The district court ruled that the two uses were incompatible because they
were of different kinds —i.e., a detention pond and public road. (R. 635.) The
court rejected Schroeder's argument that the compatible use doctrine applies
when the uses are of different kinds, especially where the condemning party
compensates for expenses related to making the uses compatible. (R. 631-32.)
Schroeder appeals from summary judgment in favor of UDOT.
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II.

Statement of Facts
Schroeder owns a parcel of land near Provo, Utah, that borders 1-15. (R. 7.)

Schroeder's parcel is currently vacant, but zoned for development. (R. 634.)
Schroeder plans to build a storage facility on its parcel. (Id.)
Clyde and Linda Edwards owned real property adjacent and to the north
of Schroeder's parcel.3 (R. 7, 634.) Schroeder currently has a 16.5 foot easement
across the property and uses this easement to access its parcel. (R. 634.) As
Schroeder moved forward with its plans to build the storage facility, it learned
that Provo City requires public roads to be 24 feet wide to allow vehicles to travel
safely. (R. 156.) To comply with that requirement, Schroeder needed to widen
its easement by 9.5 feet. (R. 155-56.) Schroeder attempted to negotiate with the
Edwards to purchase the additional land to widen the easement. (R. 156.) When
negotiations failed, Schroeder filed an action to condemn the additional 9.5 feet
needed to widen the easement. (Id.)
After Schroeder filed its condemnation action, the Edwards conveyed the
property to UDOT. (R. 633.) UDOT planned to use this land for a drainage ditch
and detention pond to retain and control highway water runoff as part of its
Interstate 15 "CORE" highway construction project. (Id.)
Once UDOT became a defendant in Schroeder's condemnation action, it
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the condemnation claim fails
as a matter of law because UDOT's use— the detention pond—is a "more
3

A map showing the relation of the parties/r properties is at Addendum D.
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necessary public use" than Schroeder's public road. (R. 345-52.) Schroeder
argued that the "more necessary public use" requirement does not apply because
the two uses are compatible. (R.T. 687:27-29.) Under the compatible use
doctrine, when property can reasonably accommodate two public uses, a court
must permit both uses. (R.T. 687:28-29.) Schroeder argued that with feasible
alterations, UDOT's use would be compatible with Schroeder's use.4
The district court held a hearing on UDOT's motion for summary
judgment. (R.T. 687.) UDOT conceded that "[t]here is no question" it would be
"feasible" for Schroeder's road to coexist with UDOT's detention pond. (R.T.
687:30.) UDOT also represented to the court that accommodating Schroeder's
use would not result in many additional costs. (Id.) Despite those concessions,
UDOT argued that Schroeder's use was incompatible with UDOT's use because
Schroeder's use was different in kind, was not as important, and was "contingent
upon extra events happening." (Id.)
The district court granted UDOT's motion for summary judgment. First,
the court concluded that, even though UDOT acquired the property from the
Edwards during the condemnation action, UDOT's "intended use commenced
with the transfer of title" from the Edwards to UDOT, and, therefore, UDOT had
"already appropriated" the property. (R. 631-32.)
4

Schroeder also requested to conduct additional discovery under Rule 56(f) to
determine whether and how the two uses were compatible. The district court
allowed that discovery, considered much of the additional evidence gathered,
and made findings of fact in granting summary judgment. (R. 632-35.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second, the district court concluded that when "property is already
appropriated to some public use/' another proposed use of the property must be
for a "more necessary public use" and Schroeder's use of a public road was not
more necessary than UDOT's public highway project. (R. 631.)
Third, the district court ruled that Utah's compatible use doctrine applies
only where: (i) the condemnor and the condemnee propose the same use for the
property; and (ii) "the prior use is not dispossessed or deprived." (R. 631.)
Finally, although the court recognized that it may be "feasible" for the
property to be used to benefit the public as both a public road and detention
pond, the court nonetheless ruled that the uses are incompatible: "Schroeder's
proposal is not compatible with the intended and designed UDOT use," and as
such, it "does not fall within the compatible use doctrine as adopted by the Utah
court." (R.631.)
The district court's order was certified as final under rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Schroeder filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 630,
671.)
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Summary of the Argument
Schroeder filed a condemnation action to widen an easement for the
construction of a public road across property owned by Clyde and Linda
Edwards. After Schroeder filed this lawsuit, UDOT purchased the property and
defended against condemnation on the ground that it planned to use the
property for a drainage ditch and detention pond, a use UDOT claimed was
more necessary than Schroeder's public road.
In Utah, a party seeking to condemn land for a public use must satisfy four
statutory criteria: (i) the proposed use must be authorized by law; (ii) the taking
must be "necessary" for that use; (iii) the construction and use must "commence
within a reasonable time" after initiation of the condemnation proceeding; and
(iv) "if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to
be applied is a more necessary public use." Utah Code § 78B-6-504. Here, only
the fourth element—the "more necessary public use" requirement—is at issue.
This appeal centers upon whether the "more necessary public use"
requirement applies. An exception to that requirement is known as the
"compatible use" doctrine. Under the compatible use doctrine, the relative
necessity of the uses is irrelevant if (i) the uses can be made compatible without
destroying the existing use and (ii) the condemnor pays expenses related to any
modifications needed to make the uses compatible. Monetaire Mining Co. v.
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Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172,177 (Utah 1918); Postal Tel. Cable
Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735, 739 (Utah 1901).
The district court erred in defining the scope of the compatible use
doctrine and in applying that doctrine in light of the following two undisputed
facts: (i) UDOT conceded that with a few alterations, the detention pond could
coexist with Schroeder's public road (R.T. 687:30); and (ii) Schroeder was willing
to compensate UDOT for any associated expenses. (R.T. 687: 30,32.) In light of
UDOT's concession and Schroeder's offer to provide just compensation, the
district court erred in two ways in ruling that the uses are not compatible.
First, the district court erred in ruling that two uses are not compatible
unless they are of the same kind. In making that ruling, the district court relied
on a 1918 Utah Supreme Court case that happened to involve uses of the same
kind—sharing a mining tunnel. Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 172-74. But
other cases make clear that the compatible use doctrine applies where the uses
are of different kinds. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 736, 739 (a telegraph and a
railroad).
Second, the district court erred in ruling that anything less than full
compatibility foreclosed condemnation. Under the compatible use doctrine, a
landowner may be required to alter an existing use to accommodate a second
public use, especially when the condemning party compensates the landowner
for resulting expenses. Id. at 739-40 (allowing telegraph to construct line so long
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as it compensated railroad); Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 174 (with a few
"arrangements" it would be "feasible and practicable" to accommodate both
uses).. Here, UDOT conceded that the alterations were feasible, and Schroeder
agreed to compensate UDOT for any expenses. (R.T. 687:30,32.) Under those
circumstances, the uses are "compatible" and the public should have the benefit
of both public uses.
This court should vacate the judgment and remand to permit the court to
apply the correct legal standard in determining whether the uses are compatible.
Argument
Under Utah's compatible use doctrine, if two uses can stand together,
"they must so stand." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co.,
67 P. 672, 677 (Utah 1902). Here, UDOTs use is a drainage ditch and detention
pond, and Schroeder's use is a public road leading to Schroeder's adjacent parcel.
After Schroeder filed its condemnation action, UDOT purchased the
subject property and claimed that UDOTs use—the detention pond—would be
in the same location as the public road. But that is insufficient to demonstrate
incompatibility under the compatible use doctrine, especially in light of UDOTs
concession that it is feasible to alter the detention pond to make the two uses
compatible, and Schroeder's agreement to compensate UDOT for expenses
associated with any necessary alterations.
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In light of UDOTs concessions, the only issue on appeal is whether Utah's
compatible use doctrine applies where uses easily can be altered to be
compatible. It does. Below, Schroeder first will describe the origin and
development of the compatible use doctrine as a necessary implication of the
"more necessary public use" requirement in the eminent domain statute. Utah
Code § 78B-6-504. Schroeder then will explain how the district court's narrow
interpretation of "compatible use" is inconsistent with Utah law. Schroeder then
will demonstrate that the uses are compatible in light of UDOTs concessions.
This court should vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to
determine whether the uses are compatible under the correct legal standard.
I.

The Origin and Development of Utah's Compatible Use Doctrine
For more than a century, 5 a party seeking to condemn land for a public

purpose must satisfy four statutory criteria. Utah Code § 78B-6-504. First, "the
use to which it is to be applied" must be "a use authorized by law." Id. § 78B-6504(1)(a). Second, the taking must be "necessary" for that use. Id. § 78B-6-

5

Copies of the Utah statutes attached at Addendum E demonstrate that the
statutory provision relevant here has not changed materially since 1888. Utah
Code § 78-34-3(3), -4(3) (1953) (Private property may be "appropriated to public
use; provided, that such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary
public use than that to which it has been already appropriated;" and "[i]f already
appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to be applied is
a more necessary public use."); Utah Code § 104-34-3(3), -4(3) (1951) (same); Utah
Rev. Stat. § 104-61-3(3), -4(3) (1943) (same); Utah Code § 104-61-3(3), -4(3) (1933)
(same); 1917 Utah Laws §§ 7332(3), 7333(3) (same); 1888 Utah Laws §§ 3843. s
1107(3), 3844. s 1108(3) (same).
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504(1)(b). Third, the construction and use of the property must "commence
within a reasonable time" after the initiation of the condemnation proceeding.
Id. § 78B-6-504(l)(c). And fourth, "if already appropriated to some public use,
the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use." Id.
§ 78B-6-504(l)(d). In the proceedings before the district court, only the fourth
element was at issue. (R. 632-35.)
The "more necessary public use" requirement—sometimes referred to as
the "prior public use" rule—is common to most eminent domain statutes
throughout the nation. Although courts have cited various rationales for the
requirement, the two most common are: (i) in delegating eminent domain power
to municipal or private corporations, the legislature could not have intended
"that the public use of one be subject to destruction, through condemnation, by
the public use of another, because both uses have been authorized by the
sovereign;"6 and (ii) applying the more necessary public use requirement
prevents circular, recriminatory, or serial condemnations.7
6

Mark S. Arena, The Accommodation of 'Occupation' and "Social Utility" in Prior
Public Use Turisprudence, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 233, 237-38 (1988); see also Hiland v.
Ives, 228 A.2d 502, 505 (Conn. 1967) ("[I]t is not to be assumed, in the absence of
a clear intention expressed or necessarily to be implied, that the sovereign, in
delegating the power of eminent domain to a private or municipal corporation,
intended to give the power to destroy a preexisting public use. But for this rule of
statutory interpretation, one public use would be subject to destruction for
another such use, even though the use of condemnor and that of condemnee had
each been authorized by the sovereign.").
7
See, e.g., Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 30
Colo. 204,212, 69 P. 568,571 (1902) (noting that without the prior public use rule
"there would be no reasonable limit to the conditions under which the power of
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Whatever the rationale, in the early 1900s, this court, along with many
others, recognized that implicit in the "more necessary public use" requirement
is an exception that applies when multiple public uses can coexist, and, therefore,
it is unnecessary to prioritize them and decide which is more necessary. Indeed,
courts have consistently recognized that where a proposed public use will not
destroy the current public use, the statute allows both parties to utilize the
property for public benefit. See, e.g., Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
ConsoL Mines Co., 174 P. 172,177 (Utah 1918); Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v.
Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735, 739 (Utah 1901). The practice of allowing the
public to benefit from both uses whenever possible became known as the
"compatible use" doctrine.
Apart from being the necessary implication of the "more necessary public
use" requirement, the compatible use doctrine stems from the policies
underlying the eminent domain statutes: to encourage the use of land to its
fullest extent to yield the greatest public benefit. N.M. Long & Co v. CannonPapanikolas Constr. Co., 343 P.2d 1100,1102-03 (Utah 1959) (noting it is "salutary
public policy" to encourage "the development of property for useful purpose.").
To maximize public benefits, if "two public uses can stand together without
material impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so stand."
eminent domain might be exercised."); Greater Clark Cnty. Sch. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Co., 179 Ind. App. 331, 333-34,385 N.E.2d 952, 954 (1979) ("[A]bsent the
prior public use rule, the land could be condemned back and forth
indefinitely.").
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Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177; Salt Lake City Water, 67 P. at 677; Postal
Tel Cable Co., 65 P. at 739.
The compatible use doctrine also finds support in the eminent domain
statute's authorization of the taking of land for an array of public purposes. Utah
Code § 78B-6-501. As one court recognized more than a century ago, the fact that
numerous public uses may further the public interest implies that where two
authorized public uses can stand together, they must stand together. City of
Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 30 N.E. 611, 611 (Mass. 1892) (noting it is
"extremely improbable that the legislature could have intended, by the special
act authorizing the city of Boston to take the land to lay water-pipes, to suspend
the right of the town of Brookline to lay out a way over it").
Recognizing such rationales, the Utah Supreme Court first adopted and
applied the compatible use doctrine in 1901. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. 735.
Postal Telegraph involved a dispute between a telegraph company and a
railroad. Id. at 736. The telegraph company offered to purchase part of a
railroad's land for the purpose of expanding its telegraph line. Id. After
negotiations failed, the telegraph company filed a condemnation action to obtain
a right of way along the railroad track "for the purpose of constructing,
maintaining, and operating its telegraph line" from Salt Lake City to Idaho. Id.
The railroad company filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the telegraph
company had no right to condemn a portion of the railroad's right of way
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because the land was already appropriated to a public use, and the telegraph
company had not established that its use for a telegraph was more necessary
than its existing use by the railroad. Id. at 739.
The district court held a hearing, and the telegraph company offered
testimony to establish its use was consistent with the railroad's existing use and
would not significantly interfere with railroad's operations. In response, E.E.
Calvin, the General Superintendent of the railroad, testified that allowing the
telegraph to put its line next to the railroad tracks would be a significant
"interference" with the railroad's operation and future use and would create "an
added danger" to the railroad. (See Brief Abstract of Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company at 101, Postal Telegraph Cable Company v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company, 65 P. 735 (1901) (No. 1252), filed September 28,1900,
hereinafter "Brief of Appellants," attached as Addendum F). Specifically,
Mr. Calvin testified that allowing the telegraph line next to the railroad would
cause the following problems:
•

It would be an added cost to the railroad and would require
the railroad to hire more workers to deal with the added
maintenance;

•

The sagging wires from the telegraph line would create an
added danger because they could be blown in the way of the
train or break and fall on the track;

•

The added danger caused by the telegraph line would expose
the railroad to liability and the railroad's passengers to
personal injury;
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• The telegraph poles and wires would directly affect the
speedy and efficient operation of the railroad's business;
• The telegraph would directly frustrate the railroad's concrete
plans, provided for in its appropriation, to widen the
embankment of its roadbed because the railroad needed the
same land for this project that the telegraph sought to
condemn.8
Id at 103-107.
After hearing from both parties, the district court denied the railroad's
motion to dismiss, and the railroad appealed. This court affirmed. Postal Tel.
Cable Co., 65 P. at 739. This court first recognized that under the condemnation
statute when "lands have been once taken, by virtue of the power of eminent
domain or otherwise, and appropriated to a public use . . . such land cannot
again be subjected to another public use, unless such secondary appropriation be
authorized by the legislature." Id. at 739. But after announcing that general rule,
the court went on to say:
The authorities however affirm that this rule only
applies when the second public use, by reason of its
nature or character, necessarily supersedes or destroys
the former use. Where, as in this case, the construction
of the telegraph line will not materially interfere with
the use of appellant's land for railroad purposes, it is
clear that the rule does not apply.

8

E.E. Calvin's testimony makes clear that these plans were not just ideas, but that
they were reasonably certain future intentions. Specifically, he stated that "[i]t
will not all be done this year, but it is all provided for in our appropriation for
the immediate future for a large portion of the district, that would be covered by
this line." (Brief of Appellants at 103).
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Id. (emphasis added). The court then held that despite the inconvenience to the
railroad, and even in light of the modifications the railroad would need to make
to its planned roadbed and additional effort to maintain its current operations
efficiently, as long as the telegraph company compensated the railroad for those
expenses, the uses were compatible under the compatible use doctrine. Id.
This court again addressed the compatible use doctrine nearly two decades
later. Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172
(Utah 1918). In Monetaire Mining, the plaintiff mining company sought to
condemn the right to use a portion of a mining tunnel used by the defendant
mining company. Id. at 173. The plaintiff owned a valuable mining claim at the
end of the tunnel, but had no ability to take advantage of it because the
defendant owned most of the mining tunnel and had exclusive access to it. Id.
The defendant mining company opposed the condemnation action, challenging
the right of the plaintiff mining company to condemn a part of its tunnel for any
purpose because the defendant was already using it. IcL at 174.
The district court ruled that the plaintiff mining company had no right to
condemn a portion of the tunnel. The plaintiff mining company appealed. On
appeal, this court held that "[t]he evidence is without dispute that the tunnel is
not being used or operated to its full capacity/' and, therefore, it would be
"feasible" and "practicable" for both parties to use the tunnel:
Under the statute of eminent domain the law seems to
be well settled that, where two public uses can stand
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together without material impairment or impediment of
one by the other, they must so stand.
Id. at 174,177 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In support of that reasoning, this court quoted with approval Boston Water
Power Company v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corporation, 23 Pick. 360 (Mass.
1839), a seminal case in the development of the compatible use doctrine. Under
the rule announced in Boston Water, two uses must "stand together" even if
there is "some interference of the latter with the earlier," because such
inconvenience may "be compensated for by damages." Monetaire Mining Co.,
174 P. at 177 (quoting Boston Water, 23 Pick. 360). In other words, the
compatible use doctrine applies even if the existing use must be altered for the
two uses to be compatible in practice, as long as the condemning party
compensates for expenses associated with the interference or alterations.
Taken together, Postal Telegraph and Monetaire Mining provide the
foundation for Utah's compatible use doctrine and clarify that in considering
whether two uses are compatible, Utah courts should adhere to the following
principles: (i) public uses need not be the same kind to be compatible, and
(ii) some interference and inconvenience to the current use by the proposed use
does not defeat a condemnation action so long as alterations are feasible and the
current owner is justly compensated for any related expenses.
Under those principles, the district court in this case erred in ruling that
the compatible use doctrine does not apply.
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II.

The District Court Incorrectly Defined the Scope of Utah's Compatible
Use Doctrine
In defining the scope of Utah's compatible use doctrine, the district court

made two errors of law. First, the district court ruled that Schroeder's use of a
public road is incompatible with UDOT's use of a detention pond because the
uses are not of the same kind. Second, the court ruled that UDOT was not
required to accommodate both uses, even though Schroeder agreed to donate
land and compensate UDOT for associated expenses.
A*

A Proposed Use and an Existing Use Need Not Be of the Same
Kind to Be Compatible

The district court first erred in ruling that two public uses must be of the
same kind to be compatible under the compatible use doctrine. At the hearing
on UDOTs motion for summary judgment the court ruled:
It's clear to me t h a t . . . the compatibility part is —under
Monetaire [Mining] doesn't work out. There is no
compatibility if we can't keep it within that same use.
In reading through Monetaire that's what I think [the
court is] deciding, and that's going to be my finding and
ruling today.
(R.T. 687:41 (emphasis added).) That ruling directly conflicts with Utah law.
Although the public uses happened to be the same in Monetaire Mining, this
court has recognized that uses do not have to be of the same kind to be
compatible under the compatible use doctrine. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739
(authorizing telegraph to condemn railroad's land for the construction of a
telegraph line).
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Under Utah law, when one party is using property for a public purpose
and a second party seeks to condemn a portion of that land for another distinct
public purpose, the second party need not seek to use the property for the same
purpose for the uses to be "compatible." I d at 738-39 (telegraph company could
condemn right of way from railroad company to construct and maintain its
telegraph lines); see also Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
119 F.2d 16,20 (10th Or. 1941) ("It is well settled" under Utah law "that property
devoted to one public use may, under general statutory authority, be taken for
another public use, where the taking will not materially impair or interfere with,
or is not inconsistent with the use already existing.").
The same is true in numerous other jurisdictions that authorize takings for
a second (and different) public use, so long as that use can be compatible with
the first.9 The district court erred in ruling that the compatible use doctrine
applies only where the uses are of the same kind.
9

See, e.g., Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester R.R. Corp., 23 Pick.
360 (Mass. 1839) (railroad could condemn portion of water company's receiving
basin, to construct railway); City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 30 N.E. at
611 (permitting a town to lay out a street over land in which a city had laid its
water pipes); Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. State Highway Comm'n, 284 So. 2d 50
(Miss. 1973) (allowing a state highway commission to condemn for construction
of an interstate highway part of a school board's land that was being used for
recreational purposes); Mont. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 900 P.2d 888
(Mont. 1995) (power company's desired easement across railroad's property to
construct power lines was not inconsistent with the operation of the railroad);
Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. Co. v. State Rd. Dep't, 176 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (permitting a state road department to widen a road by condemning
portions of a railroad company's right of way used for drainage); Long Island
R.R. Co. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 103 A.D.2d 156,165-66 (N.Y. App. Div.
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B.

Interference and Inconvenience to the Current User Will Not
Defeat a Condemnation Action, Especially Where the Condemnor
Will Compensate for Alterations to the Current Use

The district court also erred in ruling that "[w]hile it may be feasible/' to
accommodate both projects, "Schroeder's proposal is not compatible with the
intended and designed UDOT use" because the uses could be compatible only by
requiring UDOT to make "modifications," including the acquisition of additional
property Schroeder would give to UDOT. (R. 631-32.)
There are three problems with the district court's ruling. First, the
compatible use doctrine does not require that the current use remain
unburdened. Second, the compatible use doctrine applies even if
accommodating the second public use results in expenses, as long as the
condemnor will pay just compensation to make the uses compatible. Third, were
the rule otherwise, current users would have an incentive to formulate their uses
to conflict with any proposed uses just to defeat condemnation actions and
thereby deprive the public of the benefit of the additional public uses.
1.

A Proposed Use Is Compatible With an Existing Use Even
Where the Proposed Use Will Interfere with the Existing Use

The district court first erred in ruling that two uses are not compatible
where the proposed use will burden the current use. But under the compatible

1984) (allowing a gas and electric corporation to take an easement for placement
of poles carrying overhead lines and conduits carrying underground lines in
property owned by a railroad company); Vill. of Amityville v. Suffolk Cnty., 132
N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (holding county could condemn a right of way
for a highway through a village's parking field).
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use doctrine, a second use is incompatible with an existing use only if "by reason
of its nature or character/' the proposed public use "necessarily supersedes or
destroys the former use." Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739 (emphasis added). 10
In fact, even "[w]here there would otherwise be a material interference," courts
have allowed a condemnation action to go forward "upon the condemnor's
agreement to take affirmative action to avoid the interference." 11
Interference, inconvenience, or even permanent damage is insufficient to
defeat a condemnation action. Hous. Auth. of City of Fort Lauderdale v. State
Dep'tofTransp., 385 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting it "is not
material that some inconvenience may result to the prior user, if the conditions
are such that the two uses can stand together."); Lake Cnty. Parks & Recreation

10

Gold v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 53 N.E. 285,289 (Ind. 1899) (noting that
a proposed use is incompatible with an existing use if it "would necessarily
supersede, or be destructive of, the current use of the land"); City of Worthington
v. City of Columbus, Nos. 01AP-1119-1120,2002 WL 977341,115 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002) ("[W]hen a condemnor, to which the power of eminent domain is given by
law, seeks to exercise its power with respect to property already devoted to
public use, its action may be enjoined if the proposed use will either destroy the
existing use or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount to destruction."
(emphasis added)).
11
Patricia Winmill, Acquisition of Rights-of-Way by Condemnation, Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Special Institute, 102A RMMLF-INST at § 9-20 (1998). It
is important to note that Schroeder does not argue that the compatible use
doctrine would require that a condemnation would be allowed in every case.
Indeed, uses that would destroy or make impossible existing uses fall outside the
scope of the compatible use doctrine. Whether a condemnation is allowed when
the condemnor's use would interfere with the plans of the current property
owner depends on the nature and extent of the interference, as well as how
feasible it is for the second user to preserve the existing use. See infra, Part IB,
§3.
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Bd. v. Indiana-American Water Co., 812 N.E.2d 1118,1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(" Although we agree that the installation of the water main will temporarily
disrupt the Board's use of the property, Indiana-American's use of the easement
will not permanently affect the Board's use of the property as a recreational
hiking and bike path."); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville C & St. Ry. Co., 182
S.W. 254 (Term. 1916) ("the theory underlying our statute is that when the
interference does not [obstruct], the inconvenience and impairment may be
compensated for in damages and the taking for the second use is permitted.").
Instead, the two uses must be inherently incompatible and incapable of
standing together. While Schroeder's road may require UDOT to make some
alterations, UDOT has admitted that "[t]here is no question" that it is "feasible"
for the land to be used for both projects, with little cost to UDOT. In the district
court, a representative for UDOT conceded that:
It is feasible. There is no question about t h a t . . . .
[Schroeder] is correct. . . . Provo River Contractors in
anxious to [go] forward and they've said we'll work with
Schroeder. Schroeder is willing to augment the use by
adding some additional property, and so that won't cost,
it won't delay, we can accomplish this. Yes, we can
accomplish it, but is it harmonious with the present use?
It is not. It is only rendered harmonious by the addition
of this extra property.
(R.T. 687:30.) In light of that concession, the two uses here are compatible under
Utah's compatible use doctrine.
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2.

A Proposed Use Is Compatible With an Existing Use Where
the Condemnor Agrees to Provide Just Compensation for
Expenses Related to Interference with the Existing Use

The district court also erred in ruling that the two uses are incompatible in
light of Schroeder's agreement to donate the needed land to accommodate both
projects and to compensate UDOT for related expenses. Under the compatible
use doctrine, if the condemnor compensates an existing user for expenses related
to burdens caused by the new use, then the uses are compatible.
That rule is best illustrated in Freeman Gulch Mining Company v.
Kennecott Copper Company, 119 F.2d 16,17 (10th Cir. 1941), in which a mining
company sought to condemn the land of another mining company for use as a
dump. The other mining company was already using the land for mining
purposes, and the dump indisputably would have interfered with that use. Id. at
19-20. To help minimize interference, the second mining company offered to
construct new shafts, open trails, and drive a new tunnel for the first mining
company to use. LI In applying Utah law, the court held that because the
second mining company could make reasonable adjustments to preserve the
existing use, the proposed use would not materially interfere with the existing
operations, and, thus, condemnation was appropriate. L± at 20 ("for such
inconvenience as Freeman may suffer, it may be adequately compensated for in
damages/7).
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Freeman Gulch is consistent with cases decided by Utah courts, 12 and with
cases in other jurisdictions, that similarly hold that a condemnation may proceed
even though the condemnor's use is inconsistent with the owner's use so long as
the condemnor makes reasonable accommodations to remedy any interference. 13
Perhaps the most famous case applying that rule is a seminal case from
Massachusetts relied upon by this court in developing Utah's compatible use
doctrine. Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177 (quoting Boston Water Power
Company v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360-98 (Mass. 1839)). Boston Water
involved a dispute between a water power company and a railroad company. 23
Pick, at 360. The water power company had built a dam and erected mills for the
12

Tacobsen v. Memmott, 354 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1960) (allowing mining
company's condemnation action to go forward so long as mining company
would agree to move location of its right of way if it conflicted with current
owner's use); Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177 (allowing condemnation for
common use of tunnel, because condemnor's agreement to construct turnouts
and sidetracks would reduce interference to minimal level); Postal Tel. Cable Co.,
65 P. at 739 (allowing telegraph company to construct telegraph line so long as it
took precautions to minimize interference with railroad operations); Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 78 P. 296,296-97 (Utah 1904) (affirming
issuance of condemnation decree on condition that condemnor agreed to move
aerial tramway towers when necessary to allow condemnee to use his mining
property).
13
See, e.g., Steele v. Empson, 41 N.E. 822, 825 (Ind. 1895) (noting that although
plan for construction of drain was "partly located" on the right of way of current
property owner, steps could be taken so drain would not "destroy" the use of the
right of way); Montana Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 748 P.2d 444,452 (Mont.
1987) (remanding condemnation action for trial court to consider "the possibility
of joint operation to safeguard the rights of each party"); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Nashville C & St. Ry. Co., 182 S.W. 254,258 (Term. 1916) (noting telegraph
company could condemn land along railroad line so long as it agreed to shift the
location of its line and reset its poles to conform to changes in the railway's
tracks).
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purpose of generating water power to sell to the public. Id. The railroad
company sought to condemn a portion of the water company's land and waters
to construct railroad tracks across the water company's receiving basins. Id.
The water company argued that allowing the railroad company to
construct its railroad across the basin would "greatly diminish the water power,"
causing "irreparable injury" and "nuisance." IcL at 363. The railroad company
conceded that "the piers, embankments and bridges" erected in the construction
of the railroad tracks in and over the full receiving basins would permanently
"diminish the volume of water which those basins would otherwise contain,"
therefore "impairing] and diminish[ing] the water power to be derived
therefrom." Id. at 390. But the railroad company contended that despite the
inconvenience and irreparable injury to the water company, the railroad still had
the right to condemn. Id. 391-92. According to the railroad, because the two
uses could stand together, they necessarily must stand together, and the remedy
was not to dismiss the condemnation action, but to require the railroad to
compensate the water company, which after all is the principle underlying
condemnation in the first place. Id. The district court agreed, and the water
company appealed. Id. at 390.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed. Although the court
recognized that the water company would be irreparably harmed from the
condemnation, it held that the railroad's project and the water company's
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franchise were public uses that "could both stand together," because the
railroad's proposed use could not be "considered as annulling or destroying [the
water company's] franchise." Id. at 392, 394 (emphasis added). Although the
railroad's project would admittedly occasion some serious damage to the power
company, the remedy for such damage was just compensation, not dismissal. Id.
at 394.
As in Boston Water, Schroeder's use of a public road is compatible with
UDOT's use not only because it would not annul or destroy UDOT's use but also
because Schroeder has agreed to compensate UDOT for related expenses. Again,
this court need not look further than UDOT's concessions in the district court.
When asked whether Schroeder's proposal to give UDOT land to relocate its
detention pond would allow the uses to stand together, UDOT stated:
It is feasible. . . . Schroeder is willing to augment the
use by adding some additional property, and so that
won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this.
(R.T. 687:30.) Thus, Schroeder's use and UDOT's use are compatible under the
compatible use doctrine. They can coexist with little inconvenience to UDOT,
and Schroeder will compensate UDOT for related expenses.
3.

The District Court's Interpretation of the Compatible Use
Doctrine Reflects Bad Public Policy

Not only is the district court's narrow interpretation of the compatible use
doctrine incompatible with Utah law, its interpretation also reflects bad public
policy by providing incentives to manipulate plans and uses to deprive the
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public of additional public uses. If the compatible use doctrine is inapplicable
any time a second use is different or inconvenient to the first, then where, as
here, the property is sold after a condemnation action is filed and the new
owner's use conflicts with the proposed use of the condemnor, the new owner
would have a perverse incentive to design its use to conflict with the proposed
use just to defeat the condemnation action.
For that reason, courts suggest that the easier it is to change the existing
use —in this case a detention pond to hold water—the more likely the use must
be altered to accommodate the condemnor's proposed use. For example, the
railroad company in Postal Telegraph that planned to widen the embankment of
its roadbed along the railroad was required to alter its planned use. Id. at 738-39
("The land which respondent seeks to condemn is not now used for any purpose.
Practically it is now idle property, and the new use promises to be one of public
utility."). Where both public uses can be accommodated, the public interest is
best served by allowing both public uses of the property.
Here, UDOT has conceded that it is "feasible" to make the uses compatible
and that it will result in little cost or delay. Schroeder has agreed to compensate
UDOT for related expenses, including donating adjacent land so that UDOT's
detention pond can exist along with Schroeder's public road. This court should
interpret Utah's compatible use doctrine to apply in such circumstances so that
property owners cannot deny the public of the benefit of multiple public uses.
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Conclusion
Under the compatible use doctrine, two proposed public uses of property
are compatible if the second use does not destroy the first use and costs related to
making the uses compatible are compensated. In the district court, UDOT
conceded that it was "feasible" to make its use compatible with Schroeder's use:
"that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this." In light of that
concession, the district court erred in ruling that the two uses are incompatible.
And because the uses are compatible, Schroeder need not show that its proposed
use is a more necessary public use than UDOTs proposed use.
This court should vacate the summary judgment in favor of UDOT and
remand to permit the court to apply the correct legal standard in determining
whether the uses are compatible under Utah's compatible use doctrine.
DATED this 16* day of April, 2012.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER L.L.C.

Troy L. Bother
Attorneys for Schroeder Investments, L.C.
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STATE OF UTAH
U TAH COUNTY

RANDY S. HUNTER (#9084)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353
randyhunter@utah.gov
Attorneysfor Defendant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS, L.C., a Utah
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF A
MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE

vs.
CLYDE C. EDWARDS, an individual; LINDA
K. EDWARDS, an individual; UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an
agency of the State of Utah, and DOES 1
THROUGH 10;

Civil No. 090404414
Judge Darold J. McDade
-

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the Utah Department of Transportation's
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. UDOT brought this motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Schroeder Investments,
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IX.'s ("Schroeder*') action against UDOT on the basis that UDOTs existing public use of the
property sought to be condemned by Schroeder is a more necessary public use than the public use
for which Schroeder bases its right to condemn.
The Court, based on the memoranda of the parties, the supporting affidavits and
documents, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, testimony, and oral arguments
presented by the parties makes the followingfindingsof fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Schroeder owns property located adjacent and to the south of the land sought to

be condemned in this action. Schroeder's property is vacant, but zoned for development.
Schroeder has asserted that it would like to place a self-storage development on this land.
2.

Schroeder's property is accessed by an existing 16.5 foot-wide easement across

the property owned by Defendants Clyde C. Edwards, Linda K. Edwards (the "Edwards"), and
UDOT (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property").
3.

Schroeder brought this action to widen the access easement from a width of 16.5

feet to a width of 25 feet. Schroeder has stated that it anticipated Provo City would approve
development of self-storage units on Schroeder's property, although evidence of such approval
from Provo City was not presented to the Court.

Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use
Utah County Civil No. 090404414
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4.

UDOT acquired its interest in the Subject Propertyfromthe Edwards for use as a

detention basin to retain and control highway water runoff and water bourne pollutants as part of
the 1-15 CORE highway construction project. UDOT's public use included a specific water
storage capacity needed for the project.
5.

In April 2009, UDOT began acquisition negotiations with the Edwards for

acquisition of the Subject Property for the detention pond. On October 14,2009 a contract was.
signed by the Edwards to sell the property to UDOT. UDOT accepted the contract and the
contract closed in early December 2009 with the Edwards to UDOT deed recorded on December
10,2009.
6.

Schroeder filed a Complaint to condemn against the Edwards on November 30,

2009 and filed an Amended Complaint naming UDOT as a Defendant on September 24,2010.
7.

UDOT has presented persuasive evidence and the Courtfindsthat the 1-15 CORE

project is of important public necessity on local, state, national and international levels.
8.

UDOT has presented persuasive evidence and the Courtfindsthat the detention

pond is important to both water quality and to control highway water runoff andfloodpotential.
9.

The Court finds factually that the public use by UDOT is of greater public

necessity as contemplated by UDOT, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(l)(d) than Plaintiff
Schroeder's intended use as a by-way to a proposed self storage development.

Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use
Utah County Civil No. 090404414
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10.

The Courtfindsfactually that Schroeder's proposed use is not compatible with

UDOT's detention pond without additional modifications being made to the pond and in
particular additional property being acquired to redesign and expand the pond in order to
maintain the UDOT specified design capacity.
11.

According to the testimony of Ross Gravette, proffered by Schroeder, Schroeder's

proposed public use of the Subject Property as a by-way cannot occur without significant
modifications being made to UDOT's detention basin. Schroeder's proposed public use would
require the detention basin to be redesigned to meet the specified water runoff capacity
requirements for the 1-15 CORE project UDOT would be required to acquire additional
property to accommodate the redesigned detention basin.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The chronology of Schroeder's filing of the original Complaint on November 30,

2009 does not elevate its proposed use of the Edwards property over UDOT's use with the
. UDOT deed being recorded December 10,2009. Under Utah law, title does not pass to a
condemnor upon the commencement of a condemnation action. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6516. UDOT acquired the propertyfromthe Edwards for the detention pond and that intended use
commenced with the transfer of title.

Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use
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2.

As a condition precedent to a taking, it must appear that if the property is already

appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary
public use. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(l)(d). The Courtfindsas a conclusion of law that
Schroeder fails this condition precedent.
3.

The Courtfindsthat Utah has accepted the compatible use doctrine as announced

in the case Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol Mines Co, et al, 174 P. 172 (Utah
1918). In Monetaire, both condemnor and condemnee desired similar use of a mining tunnel.
The Court allowed condemnation of extra capacity of the tunnel to be condemned, thus placing
the tunnel in joint use. The Court stated this was to be allowed so long as the use in common is
practicable and the prior use is not dispossessed or deprived. In the proposed Schroeder use,
there is no unused capacity to be condemned. In order to continue UDOT's use the detention
pond must be relocated on other property UDOT does not presently own. While it may be
feasible, Schroeder's proposal is not compatible with the intended and designed UDOT use.
As such, the Schroeder condemnation does not fall within the compatible use doctrine as
adopted by the Utah court. This Courtfindsas a legal conclusion the proposed Schroeder public
use is not compatible with the greater necessary UDOT public use because UDOT's use is of full
capacity of the land and there is nothing left to condemn.

Order Granting UDOT*s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use
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ORDER
The Court grants UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Schroeder
Investments on the Amended Complaint This order adjudicates all claims as between Schroeder
and UDOT and the adjudication of the remaining claims in this case will not impact or change
the ruling made and confirmed in this order. Accordingly, the court, having determined that there
is no just reason for delay, hereby certifies this decision asfinalpursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Ordered this I'j

day of

^l^pmj)^

, 2011.
BY THE COURT

m^i
DARQLDJ.MCDADE
"Fettnh Judicial District Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM

Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use
Utah County Civil No. 090404414
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Sec. 22. [Private property for public use], UT CONST Art. 1, § 22

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article I. Declaration of Rights
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. l, § 22
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use]
Currentness
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
Notes of Decisions (202)
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain-Uses for which right may be exercised, UT ST § 78B-6-501

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos)
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos)
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-6-501
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-34-1
§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain—Uses for which right may be exercised
Currentness
Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses:
(1) all public uses authorized by the federal government;
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses authorized by the Legislature;
(3)(a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of education;
(b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county,
city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, or town;
(c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and widening, deepening, or straightening their
channels;
(d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads;
(e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling,
equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose primary purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bicycle path, or
walkway; and
(f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants;
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation
by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street railways for public
transportation;
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills,
smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the
draining and reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds
and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution;
(6)(a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to access or facilitate the milling, smelting,
or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution;
(b) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other works for
the reduction of ores, orfrommines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in solution;
(c) mill dams;
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§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain-Uses for which right may be exercised, UT ST § 78B-6-501

(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground
storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, any other interests in property which may be required to adequately
examine, prepare, maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities;
(e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; and
(f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits, mills,
smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter;
(7) byroads leading from a highway to :
(a) a residence;
(b) a development; or
(c) a farm;
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for electric light and power plants;
(9) sewage service for:
(a) a city,a town, or any settlement of not less than 10 families;
(b) a development;
(c) a public building belonging to the state; or
(d) a college or university;
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation of
machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat;
(11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is:
(a) as a trail, path, or other way for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or
(b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use;
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar; and
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and necessary to their successful operation, including the
right to take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust, produced by the operation of works,
provided that the powers granted by this section may not be exercised in any county where the population exceeds 20,000,
or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate
by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at least 75% in value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated
within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of the fourmile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of
land within the limit and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an
action shall have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 942, eff. Feb. 7,2008; Laws 2008, c. 341, § 1, eff. May 5,2008; Laws 2010, c. 401, § 1, eff. May 11,2010;
Laws 2011, c. 82, § 1, eff. May 10, 2011.
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§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain-Uses for which right may be exercised, UT ST § 78B-6-5G1

Notes of Decisions (91)
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Armos)
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-502
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-34-2
§ 78B-6-502. Estates and rights that may be taken
Currentness

The following estates and rights in lands are subject to being taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for:
(a) public buildings or grounds;
(b) permanent buildings;
(c) reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned by them;
(d) any permanent flood control structure affixed to the land;
(e) an outlet for a flow, a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction
of ores; and
(f) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution, except when the surface ground is
underlaid with minerals, coal, or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be
taken over the surface ground over the deposits;
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use; and
(3) the right of entry upon and occupation of lands, with the right to take from those lands earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber
as necessary for a public use.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 943, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (9)
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-6-503. Private property which may be taken, UT ST § 78B-6-503

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos)
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos)
U.CJL 1953 § 78B-6-503
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-34-3
§ 78B-6-503. Private property which may be taken
Currentness
Private property which may be taken under this part includes:
(1) all real property belonging to any person;
(2) lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated town, not appropriated to some public use;
(3) property appropriated to public use; provided that the property may not be taken unless for a more necessary public use
than that to which it has already been appropriated;
(4) franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; provided that the franchises may not be taken unless
for free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use;
(5) all rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in Section 78B-6-501 hereof, and any and all structures and
improvements on the property, and the lands held or used in connection with the property, shall be subject to be connected
with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure; they shall also be subject to a limited use
in common with the owners, when necessary; but uses of crossings, intersections, and connections shall be made in the manner
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private injury; and
(6) all classes of private property not enumerated if the taking is authorized by law.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 944, eff Feb. 7, 2008.
Notes of Decisions (23)
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-6-504. Conditions precedent to taking, UT ST § 78B-6-504

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos)
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs &Annos)
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-6-504
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-34-4
§ 78B-6-504. Conditions precedent to taking
Currentness
(1) Before property can be taken it must appear that:
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
(b) the taking is necessary for the use;
(c) construction and use of ail property sought to be condemned will commence within a reasonable time as determined by
the court, after the initiation of proceedings under this part; and
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
(2)(a) As used in this section, "governing body" means:
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the county, city, or town; and
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political
subdivision.
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state unless the governing body of the political subdivision
approves the taking.
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, the governing body of each political
subdivision intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner of property to be taken of each public
meeting of the political subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking is expected to occur and allow
the property owner the opportunity to be heard on the proposed taking.
(d) The requirement under Subsection (2)(c) to provide notice to a property owner is satisfied by the governing body mailing
the written notice to the property owner:
(i) at the owner's address as shown on the records of the county assessor's office; and
(ii) at least 10 business days before the public meeting.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 945, eff. Feb. 7,2008.
Notes of Decisions (14)
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
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174 P. 172

Opinion

53 Utah 413
Supreme Court of Utah.

FRICK, C. J.

MONETAIRE MINING CO.
v.

COLUMBUS REXALL CONSOL. MINES CO. et al.
No. 3142. I March 11,1918. | On
Application for Rehearing, May 31,1918.
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake County; P. C. Evans,
Judge.
Action by the Monetaire Mining Company against the
Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Company and others.
Judgment for defendant named, and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Corfman and McCarty, JJ., dissenting.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*173 N. V. Jones, of Salt Lake City (Wm. M. McCrea and P.
L. Williams, both of Salt Lake City, of counsel), for appellant.
Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette, of Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
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The appellant alleges that it is a mining corporation; that
its business is to own, acquire, work, and develop mining
property; that the respondent is a corporation engaged in a
similar business; that the appellant is the owner of a certain
mining claim known as the "Haskel," which is marked "H"
on the following plat:
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r
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The complaint is very long, and we shall, in the briefest
possible terms, refer to those portions which are deemed
material.

• ! -

r
1

The plaintiff, hereinafter called appellant, commenced this
action against the Columbus Extension Mining Company,
the Rexall Silver & Copper Mining Company, the Columbus
Rexall Consolidated Mines Company, and Alexander H.
Cowie to condemn a right to use a certain mining tunnel
in common with the defendant the Columbus Rexall
Consolidated Mines Company, a corporation, hereinafter
designated respondent. The defendants other than the
respondent, for reasons appearing in the record, may be
excluded from consideration on this appeal, and we shall not
refer to them again.
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It is further alleged that said mining claim contains gold,
silver, copper, and other precious metals, and that for that
reason it is a valuable mining claim, and that the same has
been developed only in part; that a certain mining tunnel,
marked "T T" on the plat, was constructed, and of which
respondent is a part owner as hereinafter stated; that said
tunnel, from its portal, marked "P" on the plat, to the south
side line of appellant's said mining claim, marked "H", is
approximately 3,078 feet in length, of which respondent owns
all except 1,888 feet, which is that portion lying immediately
south of the point marked "e" on the plat; that the whole length
of said tunnel, from its portal to the end thereof, which is

some distance north of the northerly side line of appellant's
said mining claim, is approximately 4,700 feet; that the
distance involved in this action, however, is that portion
only which lies between the south side line of appellant's
said mining claim and the point marked "e" on the plat,
being a distance of approximately 1,190 feet; that said tunnel
passes through appellant's said mining claim about 1,200 feet
below the surface of said claim; that the appellant has an
agreement with the defendants, other than the respondent,
whereby it is given the right to use said tunnel for said
distance of 1,888 feet, together with the track and appliances
therein, for the purpose of transporting the ores containing the
precious metals aforesaid, and the waste material that may be
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produced in working and developing appellant's said mining
claim, to the outer surface of said tunnel; that the respondent
constructed said tunnel through appellant's said mining claim
without authority therefor and without its consent, and in
doing so uncovered and exposed large quantities of ores,
much of which are being wasted for reasons fully set forth in
the complaint; that the appellant desires to condemn the right
to a temporary use of the 1,190 feet aforesaid, and the track or
tramway therein, such use to be a use in common or joint use
with respondent, and to be for the purpose of transporting the
ores containing the precious metals aforesaid to the surface,
and also to transport the waste material that may be *174
developed in further developing the ores of said mining claim
to the surface, and to take into appellant's said mining claim
the tools and appliances necessary to work, and to develop the
mineral deposits therein; that the appellant seeks to condemn
the use of said tunnel, tracks, etc., as aforesaid for a limited
period of time only, to wit, for a time sufficient to permit
the appellant to mine and remove the ores containing such
precious metals from its said mining claim; that said tunnel
is not being used to its full capacity, and appellant avers that
it is practicable to make arrangements so as to permit the
appellant to use said tunnel, tracks, etc., to transport its said
ores, etc., through said tunnel, "without materially injuring or
damaging" the respondent. The complaint contains numerous
other allegations of similar import, but, in view of what
follows, we deem it unnecessary to go further into detail. The
appellant prayed for the relief outlined in the complaint.
The respondent alone answered the complaint, and the
hearing was limited to the appellant and respondent.
The answer is very long, containing 25 paragraphs. While
many of appellant's allegations are denied in the answer, yet
the principal purpose is to challenge the right of appellant to
condemn the tunnel, tracks, etc., for the purposes aforesaid,
or for any purpose.
The appellant produced evidence in support of the allegations
of its complaint. The evidence is without dispute that the
tunnel is not being used or operated to its full capacity,
and that it is feasible and practicable to operate said tunnel
so as to permit both the said respondent and the appellant
to develop their respective mining claims and the mineral
deposits therein, and to transport the ores developed and the
waste material resulting from such development through said
tunnel over a single track; that, if necessary, turnouts can be
constructed at reasonable intervals and at reasonable expense
in said tunnel, and side tracks can be laid in such turnouts so
as to permit the transportation of the ores and waste material

of both appellant and respondent without inconvenience or
interruption; that the capacity of said tunnel is variously
estimated at from 500 to 1,500 tons for two shifts each day, or
even more, depending on the motive power by which the ores
would be transported; and that said tunnel, at the time of the
trial, was used to transport only a very small fraction of that
amount. Indeed, the evidence is to the effect that the capacity
of the tunnel is sufficient to develop and to transport the ores
and waste material for at least three or four of the best mines
in that vicinity.
We remark that the foregoing plat is not intended as correctly
indicating the numerous courses of said tunnel. All that is
attempted is to give the correct distances in feet and the
general direction of the tunnel.
The theory of respondent's counsel, and upon which they
tried the case, is best illustrated by what they said after
the appellant had produced its evidence and rested its case.
Counsel said that they did not desire to present any evidence
"for the reason that the defendant [respondent here] is of the
opinion and states with confidence that the law is that no
right to condemn a right of way or easement through that
tunnel has been or can be shown." Counsel therefore took the
position, and they insist upon it in this court, that regardless
of the evidence that could be produced by the appellant the
law would, nevertheless, always stand in the way of its right
to condemn an easement in the tunnel for the purposes desired
by it. It seems the district court entertained the same view,
which, to some extent at least, is reflected in what are called
the findings, which are as follows:
"The court heard the testimony introduced
by the parties and arguments of counsel, and
thereupon took the matter under advisement.
And now, having fully considered the same,
the court finds that the evidence in the
cause is manifestly insufficient to support the
allegations of the said complaint, and that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the
defendant."
Upon those so-called findings the court entered judgment
dismissing the action, and appellant insists that the court erred
in its findings, conclusions of law, and judgment.

[1] [2] No one, we think, will seriously contend that the
foregoing constitutes a finding of facts. It is a mere conclusion
that the evidence is insufficient to authorize any relief without
finding any fact or facts. The so-called findings, and the
judgment
based
thereon,
therefore, reflect the views of the
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court and of respondent's counsel, and, in legal effect, are the
same as though the court had sustained a general demurrer to
the complaint and had dismissed the action. We shall so treat
the matter here.
We remark that the mining claim in question is an old patented
claim located under the law of 1866, and is but 200 feet
in width. The question to be determined on this appeal,
therefore, is one of law merely, which may be stated thus:
Can appellant, under our statute authorizing the exercise of
eminent domain, condemn an easement in or the right to use
the tunnel in question for the purposes desired by it?
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3588, as amended by chapter 47, Laws
Utah 1909, p. 50, is divided into 13 subdivisions, in which
are enumerated the specific purposes for which the right of
eminent domain may be exercised. It is not necessary to set
forth all of the purposes enumerated in the statute. So far as
material here, the section referred to provides:

use than that to which it has been already
appropriated."
Subdivision 5 of the section last referred to reads:
"All rights of way for any and all purposes
mentioned in section 3588, and any and all
structures and improvements thereon, and the
lands held or used in connection therewith,
shall be subject to be connected with, crossed,
or intersected by any other right of way or
improvement or structure thereon; they shall
also be subject to a limited use in common
with the owners thereof, when necessary;
but such uses of crossings, intersections, and
connections shall be made in the manner most
compatible with the greatest public benefit and
the least private injury."
And subdivision 6 is as follows:

"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the
right of eminent domain may be exercised
in behalf of the following public uses:
*** (6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels,
ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places
to facilitate *175 the milling, smelting,
or other reduction of ores, or the working
of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral
deposits; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the
deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or water
from mills, smelters, or other works for the
reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal
mines, or mineral deposits; milldams; natural
gas or oil [pipe] lines, tanks, or reservoirs; also
any occupancy in common by the owners or
possessors of different mines, quarries, coal
mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or
other places for the reduction of ores, or any
place for the flow, deposit, or conduct of
tailings or refuse matter."
Appellant contends that the right to condemn an easement in
or through said tunnel for the purposes contemplated in this
action is granted in the foregoing subdivision. Upon the other
hand, respondent contends that the right is not granted.
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3590, subd. 3, also provides:
"Property appropriated to public use;
provided, that such property shall not be
taken unless for a more necessary public

"All classes of private property not
enumerated may be taken for public use when
such taking is authorized by law."
At the hearing of the cause in this court some contention
was made that that portion of section 3588, supra, which we
have copied is not correctly printed in chapter 47, Laws Utah
1909, by which chapter said section was amended. We have
carefully compared the language of subdivision 6 of the act
as printed in chapter 47 aforesaid with the original act on file
in the office of the Secretary of State, and we find that the
only change is that in printing chapter 47 the word "pipe" is
omitted between the words "oil" and "lines." The original act
as passed reads "oil pipe lines," while the printed act reads
"oil lines." There is no other difference between the original
act as passed and the printed act. The question therefore is, Is
the right sought to be exercised by appellant granted in any
one or more of the foregoing provisions?
[3] If the right is granted, the court has but one duty to
perform, and that is to enforce it and make it effective. Upon
the other hand, if the right is not granted, either in terms or by
necessary implication, then the courts are powerless to grant
the relief appellant seeks. In examining all of the subdivisions
of section 3588 and of section 3590, one becomes convinced
that it was the intention of the legislative power of this state
to declare mining generally and the development of mines
and mineral deposits a public use, in furtherance of which
the right of the exercise of eminent domain was applied
with full force and effect. This is apparent from the first
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enactment of the law of eminent domain as found in Laws
Utah 1884, tit. 7, p. 348. Section 3588 has been amended
and extended in some particulars ever since title 7 of 1884
was enacted. The intention of the Legislature to extend the
right of eminent domain to mines and mining being clear and
unequivocal, what is the rule respecting the construction and
application that should be given to the acts of the Legislature
in granting the right of eminent domain for the uses and
purposes contemplated in the act?
[4] If appellant's application merely involved the exercise of
the right of eminent domain to construct a tunnel through, or
a road or passageway over, respondent's mining claims, or the
right to the use, in common with respondent, of any part of
the latter's ground for dumping purposes, etc., no one would
either question or doubt appellant's right to condemn the right
for such purposes. In view, however, that appellant seeks to
obtain an easement merely in a tunnel owned by respondent,
it is earnestly contended that no such right exists. By a careful
reading and comparison of the several subdivisions aforesaid,
it seems clear to us that the right of eminent domain may be
exercised to condemn an easement in or through respondent's
tunnel as contemplated by the appellant. A use in common
is clearly contemplated for some purpose, and we think the
purpose for which the appellant seeks to exercise the right
in this case is included. That certainly is so if all of the
provisions of our statute are given a fair and reasonable
application and effect. In subdivision 6 of section 3588, which
we have set forth, the power to condemn rights of way
for tunnels is expressly granted; and in section 3590, subd.
5: "All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned
in section 3588 *** shall also be subject to a limited use
in common with the owners thereof, when necessary," etc.
Tunnels, when necessary, are therefore subject to a limited
use in common, precisely as are all other "rights of way" or
easements mentioned in the statute. In view of the foregoing,
what is the rule of construction applicable here?
[5] We think it is generally agreed that where the right of
eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the
statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of
such purpose. Our statute, in clear and explicit terms, grants
the right of eminent domain for the purpose of developing
the mining industry and for the purpose of developing the
mineral resources of the state, regardless of ownership. Under
those circumstances, *176 therefore, the rule of construction
that is applied by Mr. Justice Hawley in the case of Douglass
v. Byrnes (C. C.) 59 Fed. 28, should be applied. Mr. Justice
Hawley, in passing upon the eminent domain act of the state

of Nevada respecting the development of mines (C. C.) 59
Fed. at page 31, says:
"The power of the Legislature having
been fully recognized and sanctioned, the
purpose of the act should not be hampered
by any narrow or technical objections.
The importance of encouraging the mining
industry of this state must be kept in view.
This was the object, intent, and purpose of
the Legislature in passing the act, and its
wisdom, policy, and expediency was thereby
determined. A reasonable, fair, just, broad,
and liberal view should be taken by the court
in interpreting its provisions."
To the same effect is Butte A. & P. R. Co. v. Montana U. R.
Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St.
Rep. 508.
Mr. Lindley, in discussing the right of eminent domain as
applied to mining, in his excellent work on Mines, in volume
1 (3d Ed.) p. 612, says:
"It is manifest, however, that there is a marked
tendency, evolutionary in its nature, to break
away from the old rigid rules on the subject
of 'public use,' and to enlarge the definition
of the term, so as to make it synonymous
with 'public welfare.' This tendency is no
doubt influenced to some extent by the growth
and spread of sociological ideas which seek
to influence the construction of constitutions
and statutes in the interest of the group
instead of the individual, and to authorize
the condemnation of private property for
any use which stimulates or encourages the
development of the natural resources of the
country. As to what uses will accomplish
this purpose, each state must determine for
itself. As there exist marked differences in
environment and economic conditions, it is
hardly likely that uniform decisions in all the
states will ever be reached. But the test of
'public welfare,' instead of the old doctrine of
'public use,' is being gradually extended, with
the promise of its becoming the prevailing
doctrine in most jurisdictions."

[6] It is contended that under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3590, subd.
3, J.property
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to a public
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the eminent domain statute "for a more necessary public use"
than the one for which it is appropriated. That no doubt is
the law, and, so far as we know, is generally enforced in this
country. It must also be conceded that the use appellant seeks
to make of the tunnel in question is not a more necessary use
than the one respondent is making of it. Appellant, therefore,
cannot succeed under the clause of the statute last referred to.
What appellant seeks is not to appropriate respondent's tunnel
and to dispossess the latter of its property rights therein or
of its use, but what appellant seeks is to condemn the right
to use the tunnel in common with the respondent; that is, to
condemn the unused capacity of the tunnel. Where property is
condemned for a more necessary use, the original condemner
is deprived of his ownership and use. Such is not the case,
however, where a second right to use the property or right
of way is one in common with the present owner thereof.
This distinction must be clearly kept in mind, and, if it is, no
confusion can arise. In condemning the right to a joint use
or a use in common, all that the condemner gets, or can get,
is the right to use that which the present possessor or owner
does not or cannot use. For example. If in this case respondent
uses the tunnel in question to its fall capacity, then there is
nothing left to condemn, and, as a matter of course, appellant
cannot prevail. Where, however, as clearly appears from the
evidence in this case, a tunnel is not used by the owner and
possessor thereof to its fall capacity, and it is reasonably clear
that a joint use or a use in common is practicable, then why
may not the unused portion of the tunnel be condemned upon
proper compensation being made to the owner and possessor
thereof? In doing that the owner's property is not taken from
him. Indeed, he is not even dispossessed of it nor deprived of
its use or control, but the only thing that is done is that the
owner must )deld his exclusive dominion over it for what Mr.
Lindley calls the "public welfare."

respective owners will agree upon the manner and extent
of the use. If, however, the parties cannot agree, the courts
have fall power to determine and fix the character and extent
of the compensation, and to regulate the use of the tunnel
between the parties. All this may be done after the court has
heard the evidence and is in possession of all the facts and
circumstances.
In view that the business of mining is necessarily highly
speculative; that the prices of most metals are fluctuating so
that to mine a certain grade of ore may be profitable this year
while the price may be so much lower the next that it would
be ruinous to attempt to mine it; that the contemplated ore
bodies may be much smaller in extent than was expected;
and numerous other things that might be mentioned-the joint
use of a mining tunnel of necessity must be temporary only.
It is for that reason that *177 some equitable method of
determining and fixing the compensation for the joint use
must be devised which must be based upon all the known
facts and circumstances, and must be such as to reflect
justice in each case. To fix the compensation in a lump sum
might defeat the very end in view. Some just method of
compensation is all the law contemplates, and that is all that
can be required in each case. It is manifest that in this case
no effort whatever was made by appellant and respondent
to arrive at an understanding regarding either the character
or extent of compensation, nor with regard to the nature and
extent of the use of the tunnel by appellant; and it is equally
manifest that so long as the respondent can treat the tunnel
in question as its own private affair, to which no one may
gain access except by its consent, no such an understanding
or agreement is possible.
Respondent's counsel, however, insist that it has been decided
by respectable courts that the use of the tunnel contemplated
by the appellant cannot be condemned under statutes similar
to our own. The case of Amador-Queen M. Co. v. Dewitt,
73 Cal. 482, 15 Pac. 74, is cited and relied on. In that case
the right to a joint use of the mining tunnel was denied upon
the sole ground that the joint use which was sought was for
a private and not for a public use. In view that the right of
condemnation in cases of rights of way for tunnels must be
based upon the claim that the use of mining tunnels is a public
use, it is not easy to see how the California court arrived at the
conclusion aforesaid. It would seem that if the right of way for
a tunnel may be condemned because such right contemplates
a public use, then it must also follow that the operation of the
tunnel would likewise constitute a public use. How, then, can
it be said that a joint use is a private use? It would seem that
no farther comment is necessary.

[7] [8] Counsel, however, state that there is no way to
determine what the compensation shall be to the owner. It is,
however, well settled that, where property may be condemned
for the purpose of a joint use or a use in common, the whole
matter of determining what is a reasonable compensation
under all the circumstances, as well as the regulations
respecting the use of the property, is determined and regulated
according to the rules of equity. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain
(3d Ed.) § 423. When it is once settled and understood that
the unused portion of a mining tunnel may be condemned and
may be used to develop the mineral deposits in an adjoining
mine, the respective mine owners will generally find no
difficulty in arriving at some understanding respecting the
character and extent of the compensation that shall be made
for the use of the tunnel. Moreover,
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It is, however, further contended that the decision in the case
of Headrick v. Larson, 152 Fed. 93, 81 C. C. A. 317, is
decisive of the question involved here. It is contended that in
that case it is squarely held that the joint use of a mining tunnel
may not be condemned under an eminent domain statute
similar to ours. It may be that the court which rendered the
decision in that case may ultimately arrive at the conclusion
contended for by counsel, but it is manifest that it did not do so
in that case, all of which is demonstrated by having recourse
to the language used by the court in deciding that case. After
discussing the questions involved in that case at some length,
Mr. Justice Gilbert, United States Circuit Judge, closes the
opinion thus:
"But the present suit is not a suit to condemn
a right of way over the tunnel. It is a suit in
equity to compel the joint use of a right of
way already condemned by another, and to
obtain the right to participate in the benefits
thereof, on the theory that the condemnation
has been made for a public use, and that
the applicants are members of the public for
whom such condemnation has been adjudged.
There is no allegation showing the necessity
of such common use, and nothing to show that
the appellants cannot proceed and condemn a
right of way for a tunnel, as was done by the
appellees."
[9] [10] It may safely be asserted, therefore, that all that is or
could be decided in that case is that the plaintiffs had selected
the wrong remedy. Upon the other hand, it has often been held
by the courts of the highest respectability that one easement
may be superimposed, so to speak, upon another. This is the
doctrine of this court. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Water,
etc., Co., 24 Utah, 249. In that case, at page 264, 67 Pac.
at page 677 (61 L. R. A. 648), it is said: "Under the statute
of eminent domain the law seems to be well settled that,
where two public uses can stand together without material
impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so
stand." That is the conclusion also of Mr. Chief Justice Shaw
in the case of Boston, etc., Co. v. Boston, etc., Co., 23 Pick.
(Mass.) 360-398, where, in referring to the two uses there in
question, the Chief Justice said: "Both uses may well stand
together, with some interference of the latter with the earlier,
which may be compensated for by damages." In principle is
there, can there be, any difference between superimposing
one public easement or use upon another public easement
or use, as was done in the case last above cited, and in the

cases of Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah, 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 208, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300,
Tanner v. Canal & Irr. Co., 40 Utah, 105, 121 Pac. 584, and
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 40 Utah, 126, 121
Pac. 592, and a case like the one at bar? The mere fact that
in this case the tunnel in question is owned by respondent
in no way affects the principle of law announced in the
foregoing cases. In those, as in all other cases where it is
sought to acquire property or rights by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the burden of proof rests upon
the condemner to show that the use is a public use, and
that its exercise is necessary in the particular case. Both of
those questions in this state must be determined by the court,
and both must be determined in favor of the condemner,
as preliminary questions before the property or the right to
an easement therein can be condemned. In view that the
appropriation of property and the acquiring of an easement
therein for the purposes of developing the mineral resources
of this state have always been considered as being public
uses, we cannot see any escape from the conclusion that the
right that appellant seeks to acquire is clearly for the public
use. Neither the allegations of the complaint nor the evidence
produced in support thereof leave any room for doubt on that
question.
[11] The only other question, therefore, is, did the appellant
show any necessity for the exercise of the right? As to that
we are of *178 the opinion that if the right to a joint use
of the mining tunnel may be obtained at all by condemnation
proceedings-and we are fully convinced that it may be-then
the evidence is also, prima facie at least, sufficient to show
that it is necessary for the appellant to have the joint use of
the tunnel in question in order to develop and mine the ores
in the Haskel mining claim. It seems that, if appellant cannot
reach the mineral deposits in said claim through respondent's
tunnel, the great cost of constructing a tunnel of its own will
prevent it from ever successfully developing and removing
said mineral deposits. What would be true in the case of
appellant would be equally true with respect to any person
to whom it might sell the mining claim, except possibly the
respondent. It is too late now to insist that the people of both
the state and nation are not interested in and benefited by
the development of the mineral resources and wealth of both
the state and the nation. The people are likewise interested in
having the mineral resources developed at as little cost and
expense as possible, since in no other way can the ores of the
lower grades be developed and mined. As we view it, every
element is present in this case which is required by our statute
to authorize the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The
district court therefore erred in making the so-called finding,
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in making the conclusion of law, and in entering judgment
dismissing the action.
In conclusion we desire to state that there are many allegations
in the complaint which to our minds seem unnecessary, while
there are others that might well be more specific and certain.
The same may be said of the answer. The defects in the
pleadings are no doubt due to the fact that the law upon this
question had never been settled by this court, and that both
parties, if we may say so, were merely feeling their way.
For the reasons stated the judgment is reversed and the cause
is remanded to the district court, with directions to grant
the appellant a new trial, and to proceed with the case in
accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellant to
recover costs on appeal.

THURMAN and GIDEON, JJ., concur.
CORFMAN, J.
I dissent. It is conceded that appellant is not seeking to
exercise the right of eminent domain on the ground that
respondent's tunnel is to be used "for a more necessary public
use" than the one for which it was originally constructed,
and is now being continuously occupied and used in the
operation and development of respondent's mines. In fact,
the only contention made by appellant is that it seeks to
acquire the right to a mere temporary use, a use in common
with the respondent, for the express purpose of enabling
appellant to make quick development of its mineral lands,
mine, extract, and market its ores at a nominal expense, and
with less inconvenience to itself than under the circumstances
and existing conditions could otherwise be done in the
construction of a tunnel by its own labor and at its own
cost. That the contemplated use of the tunnel in question by
appellant is precisely the same use for which the respondent,
at great expense, constructed it, and is now continuously
using it in the development and operation of its mines, is
also a conceded fact. It is also apparent from the record
here that appellant's mine, for which a right to a joint use of
respondent's tunnel is sought, is only partially developed. The
same is shown to be true of respondent's mine. The mines
of the respective parties are in the prospective stages only.
Whether the appellant would pass one mine car of material
from its mine over respondent's track each day or a thousand
is purely problematical. The future needs of respondent in that
regard are equally so. Appellant's right to acquire an interest
in the tunnel must be predicated upon either some express
legislative enactment or some reasonable intendment of our

statute, and then again some reasonable necessity for the
taking must first be shown. Lewis, the distinguished author,
in his work on Eminent Domain, after an exhaustive review
of the decisions of the several states, lays down the general
principle deducible therefrom to be:
"First. All property held for public use is still subject to the
eminent domain power of the state, with this exception: That
it cannot be taken to be used for the same purpose in the same
manner. *** The Legislature cannot take the property of A.,
such as a tollbridge, and transfer it to B., to be still used as a
tollbridge by B. in the same manner as it had been previously
used by A. This would be taking the property of A., and giving
it to B., which the Legislature is powerless to do. 'Where there
is no change in the use there cannot be a change in ownership
under the law of eminent domain.' Suburban R. R. Co. v.
Met. W. S. El. R. R. Co., 193 111. 217, 233, 61 N. E. 1090.
This rule is a restriction upon the power of the Legislature,
and is doubtless limited to the cases where the result of the
act would be to transfer the property of A. to B., both being
private individuals or corporations. ***
Second. The right to take property already devoted to
public use must be given in express terms or by necessary
implication, *** and then the taking can be only to the extent
of the necessity, and that necessity must arise from the nature
of things over which the corporation desiring to take has no
control, and not from a necessity created by such corporation
for its convenience or economy." (Section 440.)
The same author, further on in the text, says:
"A taking which is no interference, present or prospective,
with the prior use, is not within the rule. Consequently
it is generally held that an easement or joint use may be
appropriated, where the two uses are not inconsistent, and
the second is no interference with or impairment of the
first." (Section 441.)
I cannot concur in the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Chief
Justice FRICK, that, under our statutes referred to in his
opinion, the *179 appellant may acquire a right to a
temporary use in the respondent's tunnel, for the following
reasons: (1) No contention is made, nor is it shown, that
appellant has not now the same facilities to construct a tunnel
for its mine that the respondent had to construct its tunnel.
(2) The mere fact that appellant might more expeditiously,
and with less expense and inconvenience to itself, develop
and mine its ores by the use of respondent's tunnel, are not
sufficient in law to entitle it to such use.
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result in failure and a total financial loss. In either event the
I am not unmindful that the future welfare of our
burdens are met by those who have taken the initiative. If
commonwealth is largely dependent upon the development
successful, they should be permitted to enjoy their property
of the mineral resources of the state. However, as to the
rights without interference of those who have stood by until
privileges to be accorded those engaged in the mining
such a time that they may advantageously invoke the law of
industry, I feel assured our legislative bodies can be depended
eminent domain and secure for themselves, without hazarding
upon to see to it that wise laws will be enacted, in no uncertain
their money, the same advantages and benefits with those
terms, to foster and encourage the highest development of
who have, by their capital and enterprise, made it possible for
those interests not incompatible with the private rights of the
them to do that. The trial court, in deciding the case at bar,
citizen. It may be that some future legislative body of our
had before it all of the testimony offered by the appellant,
state will take occasion to say, expressly or impliedly, by
and, while it did not make specific findings the effect of the
legislative enactment, that the miner who oftentimes ventures
judgment was to deny the right sought for by appellant. Had
his all in delving into the mountain-side in search for precious
the court made specific findings negativing appellant's right
metals has no rights that his neighbors are bound to respect;
the result would have been precisely the same, and therefore
that his neighbor may stand quietly by until such time as
the failure of the trial court to do so becomes immaterial.
will be best suited to his own personal convenience and
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court was right and
economy, and then be placed on an equality with respect
should be affirmed.
to enjoyment of property rights with the one who has had
the energy and courage to actually develop the resources of
McCARTY, J. I concur in the reasoning of, and in the
the state, by invoking the power of eminent domain through
conclusions reached by, Mr. Justice CORFMAN, J.
the medium of the courts; but, until the Legislature has so
spoken in no uncertain terms, in my humble opinion the courts
of the state should deny such privileges. The mere fact that
On Application for Rehearing.
the law of eminent domain has been amended and extended
FRICK, C. J.
in recent years in many particulars relative to the mining
interests, in a way calculated to foster and encourage the
Respondents' counsel have filed a petition for a rehearing.
development of the mineral resources of the state, does not,
While a number of grounds are stated in the petition, yet
in my judgment, warrant the courts in assuming that, under
nothing really new is advanced.
any and all circumstances, the privileges accorded may be
held and enjoyed by mine owners in common. Similar rights
Counsel, in their brief, however, argue with much vigor
sought for by appellant in this action were before the courts
that the decision, if permitted to stand, will have disastrous
of California in Amador, etc., M. Co. v. De Witt, 73 Cal.
results for many reasons. Indeed, the arguments advanced,
482,15 Pac. 74, and of Idaho in Headrick v. Larson, 152 Fed.
in their nature and essence, differ little from those advanced
93, 81 C. C. A. 317, and in both of these jurisdictions they
in opposition to the decisions in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
were denied under similar statutes to our own. The hazards
113, 24 L. Ed. 77; Highland Boy Mining Co. v. Strickley,
and uncertainties of mining, in my judgment, render a joint
28 Utah, 215, 78 Pac. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, 107 Am.
occupancy and use of a mining tunnel so impractical that
St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 1110, affirmed in 200 U. S. 527,
it would be impossible for any court to fix and determine
26 Sup. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Nash v.
with any degree of certainty the terms and conditions under
Clark, 27 Utah, 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 208,
which a joint use could be had on any hypothesis that
101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300, affirmed in 198 U.
would be just and equitable, and no attempt ought to be
S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171;
made except in cases of extreme necessity. To construe our
Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394; Overman S. M.
statutes as extending the right of eminent domain beyond
Co. v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147; *180 Butte A. & P. Ry. Co.
cases of extreme necessity would very materially retard the
v. Montana U. Ry. Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R.
development of our mineral resources rather than encourage
A. 298,50 Am. St. Rep. 508; Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont.
their development. It is a matter of common knowledge
468, 48 Pac. 757; Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga.
that immense sums of private money are being continually
419; Tanner v. Canal Co., 40 Utah, 105, 121 Pac. 584; and
expended in the construction of tunnels for the purpose of
Salt Lake City v. Irrigation Co., 40 Utah, 126, 121 Pac. 592.
demonstrating the character and extent of mineral deposits in
While the decisions in some of the foregoing cases are merely
the hope of some private Digitized
gain. Some
successful,
by theare
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analogous to the case at bar, those in the others, and especially
those in the mining cases, practically cover the same ground
that is covered by the case at bar. When the decisions in those
cases were first announced no doubt the consequences were
quite as startling to contemplate to many as counsel assert the
"consequences are *** startling to contemplate" in the case at
bar. We assert, however, with the utmost confidence, that the
doctrine announced in the case at bar is in perfect harmony
with the doctrine announced in the foregoing cases.
It is contended, however, that if the decision prevails "any
railroad company having a line of road, such, for instance, as
the one between Salt Lake City and Park City, or between Salt
Lake City and Wendover, may be used in common with the
present owners so long as the necessity or convenience of the
condemning road might demand. To the objection that such a
use was in reality a taking of the road to all practical intents
and purposes, the answer would be that, so long as it was open
to the use of the real owner to the extent of his demands, the
court would see to it that any other railroad company might
have a common or joint use up to the limit of its capacity." The
foregoing, no doubt, are some of the consequences which, to
counsels' minds, are "startling to contemplate." Let us assure
counsel and all other timid persons that no such startling
consequences can or will result from the decision. Indeed,
in this state it would be utterly impossible to bring about
such consequences. Our Constitution has made that quite
unnecessary. In section 12 of article 12 of our Constitution it
is provided:
"All railroad and other transportation
companies are declared to be common
carriers, and subject to legislative control; and
such companies shall receive and transport
each other's passengers and freight without
discrimination or unnecessary delay."
The necessity of condemning a joint or use in common of a
railroad can, therefore, never arise in this state for the mere
purpose of transporting freight or passengers, even though
the law permitted one enterprise to condemn the easement
of another for mere speculative purposes. The necessity for
condemning a joint use may, perhaps, arise in some instances
for terminal purposes. When it arises, however, it no doubt
will be limited to the actual necessities of the condemning
company, and the matter may then be judicially determined.
There is little doubt that if the principle that is embodied in
the section of our Constitution which we have quoted had
been announced at any time prior to the decision of Munn
v. Illinois, supra, which was announced in 1876, it would

have been more startling to very many persons than is the
decision in the case at bar. Counsel's fears regarding what
might happen to our railroads are therefore groundless.
It is also suggested that under the decision as it stands one
mine owner might be permitted to condemn a joint use of a
mine shaft. This suggestion, it seems to us, is made for the
purpose of showing that the decision is impractical and hence
unsound. Such a suggestion is, however, not justified by
anything that is said in the opinion nor by anything contained
in our statute. There always is, and of necessity must be,
connected with every mine shaft in operation a certain
amount of machinery and appliances. There is nothing in our
statute authorizing the condemnation of mine machinery or
appliances. It might with as much force be contended that
because the joint use of the tracks of one railroad company
may be condemned for a limited purpose a joint use of its
machinery, tracks, cars, depots, depot offices, and warehouses
may therefore be condemned. Such a result does not at all
follow, and the joint use really contemplated by the statute
should not be denied merely because it is assumed that the
doctrine might be carried too far. It may well be, however, that
an abandoned mine shaft, or one no longer in use, from which
the owner has removed his machinery and appliances, could
be the subject of condemnation. These matters are, however,
not now involved except for the purpose of illustration, and
hence are not and cannot be decided.
It is further insisted that no rule regarding the measure of
damages is laid down in the opinion. As indicated in the
decision, no hard and fast rule can be promulgated in that
respect. It cannot be determined in advance what method
for the ascertainment of compensation should be adopted in
all cases. Whether payment should be made on the basis
of tonnage, or by the day or month, or otherwise, must
be determined by the court from the evidence of experts,
of whose knowledge and experience courts constantly avail
themselves. Many of the elements arising in joint or common
use of property are suggested in the case of Salt Lake City v.
Irrigation Co., supra. If the experience of experts is followed,
no great difficulty, if any at all, can arise in that regard.
But we are also told that we have not defined what constitutes
necessity in such cases. That, too, is largely a question to
be determined in each case. We have stated the facts as
they appear from the evidence, and from those facts we
did all that could be done in the opinion, namely, state our
conclusion, which is that the facts constitute a prima facie
case of necessity in a case like the one at bar.
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It is also asserted that the decision will retard rather than
stimulate the development * 181 of mining property, because
it will permit one mine owner to divide the use of his tunnels,
and will thus tend to discourage the construction of mine
tunnels. That is certainly a gloomy view to take of the matter.
Why should men refuse to develop their own mining property
simply because another, by making adequate compensation,
may, for a limited time and to a limited extent, use what the
owner cannot use?
The argument, as we understand it, is based upon the theory
that the tunnel belongs to the owner, and that no one should
be permitted to interfere, and if, forsooth, the law permits
such interference, even for adequate compensation and for
a limited time only, tunnels will no longer be run into our
mountains. Everyone knows, however, that in any event the
instances where the necessity exists for one mine owner to
condemn a joint use of another's tunnel are not numerous;
but, even though they were, no one would refuse to develop
a promising mining property merely because some one, after
making adequate compensation to the owner, might be given
the right to a joint use of the tunnel for a limited time under
the direction and supervision of a court of justice. All of us
acquire and hold much of our property subject to the right
of eminent domain, yet no one refuses either to acquire or to
improve his property because of that fact. Counsel's fears in
that respect are quite as groundless as they are in all other
respects.
Finally, it is insisted that the opinion in many respects is vague
and uncertain. Indeed, counsel who have filed the petition
contend that they are unable to grasp either its meaning
End of Document

or its purpose. If it were not for the fact that counsel on
the other side have found no difficulty whatever to fully
comprehend all that is said and all that is decided in the
opinion we might regard the contention as more serious.
The contention is, however, one that is frequently found
in applications for rehearings. The attorney who loses the
case can rarely be reconciled to a decision which is strongly
contrary to his contentions. The zeal for his client's cause,
which is commendable if kept within bounds, prevents him
from seeing what others see and from understanding what
others readily understand.
The application for a rehearing in this case differs from the
applications in ordinary cases only in that this case is perhaps
of greater importance than the ordinary case and in that the
decision is by a divided court. That, however, standing alone,
is not sufficient reason why the decision should not stand.
The majority of this court must assume the responsibility for
a decision, and, after having fully considered the questions
presented in the application for a rehearing and the arguments
from every point, we see no good reason why the opinion
should not be adhered to.
The petition for a rehearing is therefore denied.

THURMAN and GIDEON, JJ., concur.
McCARTY and CORFMAN, JJ., dissenting.
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23 Utah 474
Supreme Court of Utah.
POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO. OF UTAH
v.

OREGON S. L. R. CO.
May io, 1901.
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; A. N. Cherry,
Judge.
Action by the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of Utah,
a corporation, against the Oregon Short-Line Railroad
Company, a corporation. From a judgment in favor of
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*736 P. L. Williams, for appellant.
Powers, Straup & Lippman, for respondent.
Opinion
HALL, District Judge.
In this case it appears that on the 14th day of July,
1899, certain citizens of Utah, in connection with the
assistant superintendent and the general counsel of the Postal
Telegraph Cable Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of New York, proceeded to organize under the laws
of Utah the respondent herein, the Postal Telegraph Cable
Company of Utah. Ten per cent, of the capital stock of the
Utah corporation was paid in, the money being furnished
by the New York corporation. All the requirements of the
statutes of Utah relating to the organization of corporations
were complied with. The articles of incorporation were duly
filed with the county clerk of Salt Lake county, and a certified
copy of the same was filed with the secretary of state of
Utah, who issued his certificate, as required by law, certifying
that the respondent had complied with the provisions of the
statutes and that it was duly incorporated. The directors of
the respondent met and formally organized, directed that
negotiations be had with appellant for a right of way to
construct a telegraph line along its railroad right of way from
Salt Lake City north to the Idaho state line, and adopted
a resolution selecting the right of way, and also proceeded
to accept the provisions of an act of congress, approved
July 24, 1866, entitled "An act to aid in the construction of

telegraph lines and to secure to the government the use of
the same for postal and military and other purposes." Failing
in its negotiations, respondent commenced this proceeding
under the eminent domain act of Utah to condemn a right
of way for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and
operating its telegraph line upon the right of way of the
appellant longitudinally, from Salt Lake City north, through
the counties of Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, Box Elder, and
Cache, in this state, to the state line of Utah and Idaho,-a total
distance of about 100 miles. In its complaint the respondent
set forth the character of the construction of the telegraph
line designed, the length of the poles, their size at the base,
the depth that they would be planted in the ground, their
distance from the railroad track, and the size of the crossarms upon which wires are proposed to be strung. It was
also alleged in the complaint that, when crossing the track of
appellant, the wires would be strung high enough for safety,
and that on reasonable notice from appellant, when it was
necessary, the poles would be moved to such a point as the
appellant might designate. The distance of the poles from
each other and the amount of ground each would occupy
was alleged; the general route and termini were described;
the necessity for the taking, and the failure of the parties to
come to terms were set forth; and the fact that the telegraph
line would not interfere with the appellant's business was
stated, as well as other allegations not necessary here to
repeat. The defendant demurred to the complaint upon two
grounds: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the subjectmatter of the action, so far as the same is situated outside of
Salt Lake county and within the counties of Davis, Weber,
Box Elder, and Cache, respectively; (2) that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
After argument the demurrer was overruled by the lower
court, and the appellant answered, denying the incorporation
of respondent, and basing its defense principally upon an
allegation that the respondent is the agent and under the
control of the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of New York,
a foreign corporation, which has not the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain in this state, and which, through
the organization of respondent, is seeking to do by indirection
that which it cannot accomplish in its own name directly, and
that in reality respondent has no separate existence from the
Postal Telegraph Cable Company of New York. The case was
tried in the district court without a jury, and the court found
the issues for *737 the respondent, assessing appellant's
damages at $100.
The contention of the appellant that the lower court had
no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, so far as
the same is included within the counties of Davis, Weber,
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Box Elder, and Cache, respectively, is not tenable. The thing
which is sought by respondent by this proceeding is an
entirety. Railroad Co. v. Gough, 29 Kan. 94; Lower Kings
River Water-Ditch Co. v. Kings River & F. Canal Co., 60
Cal. 408; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 475; St. Louis & C. R. Co.
v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 530, 51 N. E. 382. The damage
which defendant is entitled to is for the whole property, and
the cause of action arises in all five counties as a unit. The
county lines crossing the right of way of appellant do not
destroy the singleness of its use. Neither does it negative the
fact that all the land constitutes but one right of way. As is
said in Lewis, Em. Dom. § 475, in defining what constitutes
an entire tract: "In general, it is so much as belongs to the
same proprietor as that taken, and is contiguous to it or used
together for a common purpose." Our statute upon the subject
of eminent domain provides, among other things, as follows:
"All proceedings under this chapter must be brought in the
district court for the county in which the property or some
part thereof is situated." This provision does not conflict with
section 5, art. 8, of our constitution, which provides that "all
civil and criminal business arising in any county must be
tried in such county." Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah,
368, 52 Pac. 628. As said by this court in the case cited,
the words of our constitution mean "that an action affecting
realty shall be tried in the county where the business or
the cause arises, or, if the cause of action arises in more
counties than one, then in either of said counties." Part of
the right of way sought being in Salt Lake county, and being
an entirety extending through the other counties named, the
respondent under our law clearly had the right to include the
whole in one proceeding. By so doing it avoided bringing
five different cases in five different courts in five different
counties to condemn the identical right of way against the
same defendant.
It is objected that the complaint does not so describe the lands
or premises which respondent asks to have appropriated to
its use that it can be definitely described in a judgment. The
complaint asks for a right of way upon the railroad right
of way between certain named termini within certain named
counties in the state, and describes the amount of ground
needed for each pole, the distance of the poles from each
other, and their distance from the railroad track. When the
object in the condemnation case is to secure a right of way
through a farm or legal subdivision, it probably should be
described by such subdivision; but this is for a right of way
on an established railroad right of way, the locus of which
is accurately fixed by survey, of which there are accessible
records. It would seem that there can be no difficulty in so
framing a judgment, with such description of the land taken,

that parties may know where it is. A railroad track is a fixed
monument. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburg, Ft. W.
& C. Ry. Co., 71 111. 40. From this fixed monument other
distances may be measured, and there does not appear to be
any difficulty in locating exactly the line of construction to be
followed by this telegraph company. The complaint describes
the property upon which the respondent proposes to locate
its telegraph line as the railway of appellant from Salt Lake
City to Cannon Station, on the state line between Utah and
Idaho. It alleges that the railroad bed is located near the center
of its right of way, which is not less than 100 feet in width;
that the railroad track is 4 feet 8 Yz inches gauge, and upon
the center of the railroad bed; that the telegraph line to be
constructed will consist of poles 30 feet in length, planted
firmly in the ground at a depth of not less than 5 feet, and 30
feet from the outer edge of the railroad track; that the poles
will be erected at a distance of 167 feet from each other on
the right of way; that each pole will be 1 foot in diameter at
the base and will occupy only 1 square foot of ground; that no
wires will be attached to appellant's fixtures, nor poles erected
upon embankments, nor will the wires interfere with any other
telegraph line; that the wires are to be attached to cross-arms
high enough so that they will not interfere with appellant's
property or business; and that the cross-arms will be 8 feet in
length. This description covers every reasonable intendment
of the statute.
It is also insisted by appellant that the respondent is not a
corporation either de jure or de facto. The respondent appears
to have complied fully with the laws of Utah. Its incorporators
entered into the required articles of agreement. They attached
the statutory oath. Ten per cent, of the capital stock was
paid to its treasurer in cash. The articles were filed with
the county clerk of the proper county. A certified copy of
the articles was filed with the secretary of state, and the
secretary of state issued his certificate of incorporation. It has
performed corporate acts. It adopted a seal, and its officers
have transacted corporate business. Clearly it is a corporation,
and, being such, it is a legal entity. Exchange Bank of Macon
v. Macon Const. Co., 97 Ga. 1, 25 S. E. 326; Richmond &
I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N. J. & B. R. Co., 15 C. C. A.
289, 68 Fed. 105, 34 L. R. A. 625. It is a citizen of Utah
(Wilson v. Mining Co., 19 Utah, 66, 56 Pac. 300), and by
subdivision 8 of section 3588, Rev. St., it is granted the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain. It may be true
that the Postal Telegraph Cable Company *738 of New
York is interested in respondent; but that fact does not devest
from respondent any of the corporate powers with which it
is clothed. There is nothing in the letter, spirit, or policy of
the law which prohibits the same persons from forming and
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conducting two or more different corporations. This same
question was before the United States circuit court for the
district of Idaho (see Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S. L. R.
Co., 104 Fed. 623) in a case upon all fours with the one at bar,
and the court said: "The next objection is that plaintiff is not
a corporation and is not organized in good faith. No one will
doubt that the organization of plaintiff was for the purpose
of co-operation with the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of
New York. It may be said that it is subordinate to the latter,
and is to assist it in carrying out its objects. It may be nothing
more than an agent. This may be said of it more from general
circumstances than from the testimony in the case. This,
however, is a common procedure with all large corporation. A
recent instance is in mind. A railroad company, now operating
in North Idaho, desiring to add a branch of about five miles,
organized an independent company to build the same; and
I think this defendant, in building the branch railroad from
Nampa to Boise, did the same. It seems not an unusual matter
for a large corporation to utilize small corporations for their
purpose. If the plaintiff, however, is organized for a fraudulent
purpose, the court will not lend its aid in the consummation
of any fraud; but this I am unable to find against the plaintiff
from the evidence. The facts are that it appears by the record to
have organized according to the statutes. It has held corporate
meetings and performed corporate acts. It has not built any
telegraph line within the territory for which it was organized;
but it is for the privilege of doing that in the place it deems
most available and best for its use that it is now in this forum.
Until it is clearly shown that this organization is based upon
fraud, or that it is for some fraudulent purpose, the court
must regard it as organized in good faith, and accede to it
accordingly the statutory rights accorded it." These views are
fully sustained by the following authorities: Cunningham v.
City of Cleveland, 39 C. C. A. 211, 98 Fed. 657; Lowler v.
Railroad Co., 59 Iowa, 563, 13 N. W. 718; Day v. Telegraph
Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 Atl. 608; In re New York, L. & W. Ry.
Co., 35 Hun, 220; Id., 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27; Com. v. New
York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 132 Pa. 591, 19 Atl. 291; Frost v.
Coal Co., 24 How. 278, 16 L. Ed. 637.
However, the authority of respondent to exercise the power
of eminent domain cannot be considered in this proceeding.
While the burden of proving its corporate existence was by
the denial in the answer placed upon respondent, it was only
necessary that it prove that it was a corporation de facto.
Dry-Goods Co. v. Box, 13 Utah, 629, 45 Pac. 629. Having
made such proof, its corporate existence cannot be inquired
into collaterally. Marsh v. Mathias, 19 Utah, 350, 56 Pac.
1074. And this proceeding to condemn a right of way is a
collateral proceeding so far as it concerns the question of the

corporate existence of respondent. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. v.
Peoria & F. Ry. Co., 105 111. 110; Wellington & P. R. Co.
v. Cashie & C. R. & Lumber Co., 114 N. C. 690, 19 S. E.
646; Turnpike Co. v. Bobb, 88 Ky. 226,10 S. W. 794; Golden
Gate Mill & Min. Co. v. Joshua Hendy Mach. Works, 82
Cal. 184, 23 Pac. 45. And it may be stated as a general rule
that the legal existence of a de facto corporation can only be
questioned by the state in a direct proceeding instituted for
that purpose. Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kan. 411; Independent
Order of Foresters v. United Order of Foresters, 94 Wis. 234,
68 N. W. 1011; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & E.
R. Co., 112 111. 601; Mortgage Co. v. Tennille (Ga.) 13 S. E.
158,12 L. R. A. 529; Stout v. Zulick (N. J. Err. & App.) 7 Atl.
362; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct.
1113,29 L. Ed. 319; National Docks Ry. Co. v. Central R. Co.
of New Jersey, 32 N. J. Eq. 755, 760; Rex v. Corporation of
Carmarthen, 2 Burrows, 869. In the case of Ward v. Railroad
Co., 119 111. 287,10 N. E. 365, the court says: "There is some
proof that the petitioner is a corporation de facto, and that is
all the law requires in this class of cases. There is evidence,
although it may be slight, of corporate acts done by petitioner.
It appears that an engineer has been appointed, the line of the
proposed road has been located, and other steps taken towards
the building of the road. *** These are corporate acts, and
tend to show that petitioner is a corporation de facto." See,
also, Colorado E. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 41
Fed. 297; Smith v. Sheely, 12 Wall. 358,20 L. Ed. 430.
That the telegraph is a public use, and the business of
telegraphy is obviously a public business, is well established.
It is a quasi public employment,-one not merely exercised
for the purpose of private gain, but for the general benefit
and welfare of the community. A telegraph company is a
public servant, which must serve all alike who make demands
upon it, and its right to exercise the power of eminent domain
is recognized by our statutes and by numerous decisions of
the courts. Rev. St. § 3588, subsec. 8; Joyce, Electric Law,
§ 274; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 172. The use, then, to which
respondent seeks to apply the land to be condemned is a public
use, recognized by law. It is, however, contended that the
land sought is already devoted to a public use, and that the
condemnation for telegraph purposes will not be devoting it to
more necessary public use. The land which respondent seeks
to condemn is not now used for any purpose. Practically it is
now idle *739 property, and the new use promises to be one
of public utility. The appropriation of the right of way of a
railroad not essential to the enjoyment of itsfranchisesand
property, for the construction of a telegraph line, is to and for a
more necessary public use. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Southern
Cal. Ry. Co., I l l Cal. 231, 43 Pac. 602.
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It is also argued that no necessity has been shown to exist
for the taking of the right of way. But it is shown that the
respondent made a bona fide effort to agree with the appellant
upon terms for the taking of the land sought, and that the latter
refused to consider respondent's proposition or to negotiate
with it at all. The necessity, therefore, exists for the taking.
It is not a question whether there is other land to be had
that is equally available, but the question is whether the land
sought is needed for the construction of the public work. The
necessity is shown to exist when it appears that it is necessary
to take the land by condemnation proceedings in order to
effectuate the purposes of the corporation. Railroad Co. v.
Kip, 46 N. Y. 553,7 Am. Rep. 385; Railroad Co. v. Brainard,
9 N. Y. 110. The respondent has the right to determine when
and where its telegraph line shall be built. It may be said
to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising the
power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of
oppression, its discretion in the selection of land will not be
interfered with. Railway Co. v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 S. W.
884; Englewood Connecting R. Co. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co.,
117 111. 611,6 N. E. 684; O'Hare v. Railroad Co., 139 111. 151,
28 N. E. 923; Stark v. Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 501; Peavey v.
Railroad Co., 30 Me. 498; Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Oil
Colony & F. R. R. Co., 5 Allen, 221; Railroad Co. v. Stoddard,
6 Minn. 150 (Gil. 92); Dietrichs v. Railroad Co., 13 Neb. 361,
13 N. W. 624; Railroad Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 325; Colorado
E. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 41 Fed. 293; New
York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gaslight Co., 5
Hun, 201. With the degree of necessity or the extent which
the property will advance the public purpose, the courts have
nothing to do. Tracy v. Railroad Co., 80 Ky. 259; In re New
York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 248; Railroad Co. v.
Hooper, 76 Cal. 404, 18 Pac. 599. When the use is public,
the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular
property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 406, 25 L. Ed. 206; St. Louis, H. &
K. C. Ry. v. Hannibal Union Depot Co., 125 Mo. 82, 28 S.
W. 483.
It is contended by appellant that the respondent had no power
to locate its telegraph line longitudinally upon appellant's
right of way, because, when the lands have been once taken,
by virtue of the power of eminent domain or otherwise,
and appropriated to a public use, as is the right of way in
controversy, such land cannot again be subjected to another
public use, unless such secondary appropriation be authorized
by the legislature. The authorities, however affirm that this
rule only applies when the second public use, by reason of
its nature or character, necessarily supersedes or destroys the

former use. Where, as in this case, the construction of the
telegraph line will not materially interfere with the use of
appellant's land for railroad purposes, it is clear that the rule
does not apply. Baltimore & O. S. W. R Co. v. Board of
Com'rs (Ind. Sup.) 58 N. E. 837; Gold v. Railway Co., 153
Ind. 232, 53 N. E. 285; Steele v. Empsom, 142 Ind. 397, 41
N. E. 822; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111
Cal. 221,43 Pac. 602; Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone
Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 52 S. W. 106;
St. Louis & C. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 521, 51 N.
E. 382. Mr. Lewis, in his work on Eminent Domain (section
269), says: "A telegraph line may be established along a
railroad right of way, it being no material interference with
the use thereof for railroad purposes." And this is undoubtedly
the law. A telegraph line, constructed as proposed, will not, in
the nature of things, interfere with the operation of appellant's
railroad.
The certificate of the postmaster general of the United States,
showing the acceptance by respondent of the provisions of
the act of congress of July 24, 1866, entitled "An act to aid
in the construction of telegraph lines and to secure to the
government the use of the same for postal, military, and other
purposes," was properly admitted in evidence. By accepting
the provisions of this act, respondent is given the right to
erect its telegraph lines upon all post roads; and by section
3964 of the Revised Statutes of the United States all railroads
are made post roads. But, before respondent can exercise
the right thus granted by congress, it must have fixed and
paid to the appellant just compensation for the easement.
This is ascertained by resorting to the state law relative to
eminent domain. The state law becomes auxiliary to the act
of congress, and provides the method of condemnation and
compensation. In other words, a right is given by this act of
congress, and the remedy is furnished by the laws of the state.
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (C. C.) 89 Fed.
190; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Postal Tel. Cable Co.
v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 49 La. Ann. 58,21
South. 183; Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 513; Rogers v. Bradshaw,
20 Johns. 735-744; Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 373,23 L. Ed. 449;
Suth. St. Const. § 399.
It is also claimed that the lower court erred in the rule as to
the measure of damages which it adopted. It is insisted that
the value of the property taken should be measured by the
most advantageous use to which it could be put. That rule
is undoubtedly correct where one owns property *740 in
fee and may put it to any use which he chooses; but it is
not the rule, as in this case, where the railroad right of way
can only be devoted to railroad uses. Even though the award
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Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474 (1901)
65 P. 735, 90 Am.St.Rep. 705

be nominal, if the sum awarded is a full and fair equivalent
for the thing taken, it is just compensation. In the case of
a railroad company whose right of way is held for railroad
purposes, it is not a question as to what the property would
be worth to the most advantageous use to which it could be
put; but the question is, how much will the land be damaged
for railroad purposes by the erection of the telegraph line? St.
Louis & C. E. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 508, 51 N.
E. 382; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 149 111.
457, 37 N. E. 78; Id., 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 38 L.
Ed. 819. The railroad company holds its right of way strictly
for railroad purposes, and is restricted in its use of the same
for such purposes. Under this view of the estate which the
railroad company has in its right of way, it is difficult to see
how the damage from the erection of a telegraph line can be
more than nominal. Evidence was introduced by appellant to
show damages from the added expense of burning grass from
the right of way by reason of the erection of telegraph poles;
but such damages are too remote. Southwestern Telegraph &
Telephone Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.)
52 S. W. 107. Neither can damages be allowed for imaginary
dangers. Jones v. Railroad Co., 68 111. 380; Railroad Co. v.
End of Document

Lamb, 11 Neb. 592, 10 N. W. 493; Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Town of Cicero, 157 111. 48, 41 N. E. 640; Lockie v.
Telegraph Co., 103 111. 401. Where, as in this case, a telegraph
company has a right under the statutes to condemn a right of
way on the right of way of a railroad, the damages to be paid to
the railroad company are nominal, in as much as the railroad
company only owns a right of way, and such a right of way is
not interfered with by the telegraph company. Railroad Co. v.
Catholic Bishop, 119 111. 529, 10 N. E. 372; Hilcoat v. Bird,
10 C. B. 327; Allen v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 319; In re
Albany St., 11 Wend. 149, 25 Am. Dec. 618; Chicago, B. &
Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 258,17 Sup. Ct. 992,
38 L.Ed. 819.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the lower
court must be affirmed, with costs.
BARTCH and BASKIN, JJ., concur.
Parallel Citations
65 P. 735, 90 Am.St.Rep. 705

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No ciaim to original U.S. Government Works.
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SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS 26' RIGHT OF WAY

N 72'07'30m E

28191

N
\

\

4

-EXIST. 1 ROD ROW PER EDWARDS DEED

^ - " ~ CLYDE C EDWARDS
ENTRY NO. '23994
\
BOOK 2240 PACE 562 .
\
(0.96 ACRES-CLYDE PARCEL
OUTSIDE OF 26*[ROW)

.A

1=100'
Vv
-NEW 26* ROW

%5' ADDITIONAL ROW (6,638 SQ FT.)-

\
\

•

0.24 ACRES-OVERLAP BETWEEN
UDOT PARCEL AND 26' ROW

X

\
\

\

x

CLYDE a EDWARDS
ENTRY NO. 23994
BOCK 2240 PAGE 562
(0.10 ACRES-CLYDE PARCEL
OUTSIDE OF 26* ROW)

UDOT
ENTRY NO. 126962:2009
(2.74 ACRES-UDOT PARCEL
OUTSIDE OF 26' ROW)

\

V
WEST J
S 88-24'31- iy>
33.46'

\

SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS LC
ENTRY NO: 142041:2006

26* ROW DESCRIPTION

l401.ib^T\
\

II

\

Beginning at a point which is on the westerly right of way
fence of Interstate 15. said point being North, 571.83 feet
and West, 1401.18 feet from the Eost Quarter Corner of
Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Sait Lake
Base and Meridian; and running thence South 88'24'31' West,
along Quit Claim Deed Entry 23994 Book 2240 at Page 562
a distance of 33.46 feet to a point which is parallel to ond
twenty six (26') feet westerly of the afore mentioned. 1-15
right of woy fence; thence North 40'35'53' West, 696.63
feet to a point on the northerly line of the afore mentioned
Quit aaim Deed; thence North 72%0T30' East, 28.19 feet to
a point on the afore mentioned fence line; thence South
40'35'53m East. 706.80 feet to the point of beginning.

EAST 1/4 CORNER OF
SECTION 34, TOWNSHIP 6
SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST
SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN.
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a843* s 1107. The private property which may be Private propader this Chapter includes:
All real property belonging to any person.
Lands belonging to this Territory, or to any county,
Eorated city, village or town, not appropriated to some
,use.
Property appropriated to public use; but such propShall not be taken unless for a more necessary public
that to which it has been already appropriated.
Franchises for toll-roads, toll-bridges and ferries,
111 other franchises; but such franchise shall not be
unless for free highways, railroads, or , other more
sary public use.
p § . All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned
ction 1105, and any and ail structures and improvements
fpn, and the lands held or used in connection therewith,
f be subject to be connected with, crossed, or intersected
|ny other right of way or improvements or structures
|bn. They shall also be subject to a limited use in comI with the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses
jpFOssings, intersections and connections, shall be made in
igier most compatible with the greatest public benefit and
I private injury.
t$. All classes of private property not enumerated; may
aken for public use, when such taking is authorized by
§ 3844. s 1108.
a

^ar !
B-: i
rt\i

Before property can be taken it must Facts necessary to be
found by court
before con-

% -l. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use demnation.
forked by law.
2. That the taking is necessary to such use.
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the
iplic use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary
"lie use.
3845. s 1109. In all cases where land is required for parties may
p c use, the Territory or its agents in charge of such use, ^ ^ t o t T i
*~ survey and locate the same; but it must be located in the i n a k e BTliyeyB'
fter which will b e m o s t compatible w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t p u b I p o d and the least private injury, and subject to the prol e s pf this Chapter.
The Territory or its agents in
* of such public use, may enter upon the land and make
l u n a t i o n s , surveys, and maps thereof, and such entry
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' C I V I L PROCEDURE—EMINENT.DOMAIN.
"•^bini of the extent to which it would
"iWd or raised.
*• v Salt Lake City, 44 U. 204; 138 P.
f companies may condemn ground for a
-:--"s|tef etc., but cannot condemn any por"bf'a right-of-way used for railroad pur"-• even though a track departs from a
<.'of-way, it cannot be approached so close
% interfere with traffic, and five feet is not.
^Unreasonable minimum distance.
JStcbum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal
" --50 U. —» 168 P. 86.

1453

Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining
generally and development of the mines and
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a
mining company has driven • a tunnel going
through a claim owned by another company,
and does not, in its own operation, use the
tunnel to its full capacity, the company owning the claim may condemn a right to use the
tunnel jointly to work its claim.
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con., 50
U. —; 174 P . 172.

55^7331. (3589.) Estates and rights subject to condemnation. The folit^ving is a classification of the estates and rights in lands, subject to be taken
jjjjfirpublic use:
'
1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for perg^nent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned
Sereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tail|§gs of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores;
' 2. An easement, when taken for any other use;
' 3 . The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to
llSfee therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be neces^safy for some public use.
•"CaL C. Civ. P., § 1239*.

7332. (3590.) Property subject to condemnation. The private prop\ erty which may be taken under this chapter includes: .
1. All real property belonging to any person;
2. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city
J or town, not appropriated to some public use;
. 3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which
it has been already appropriated;
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises;
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways,
railroads, or other more necessary public use;
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 7330, and
any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or.used
in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or
intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon;
they shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof,
when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit
and the least private injury;
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public use when such taking is authorized by law.
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1240*.
Property and franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Con. a r t 12,
sec. 11.
Decisions on property subject to condemnation, note to § 7330.
Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining
generally and development of the mines and
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a

mining company has driven a tunnel going
through a claim owned by another company,
and does not, in its own operation, use the
tunnel to its full capacity, the company owning the claim may condemn a right to use the
tunnel jointly to. work its claim.
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con.
M. Co., 50 U. —; 174 P . 172.

7333. (3591.) Conditions precedent to condemnation. Before property
can be taken it must appear;
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
2. That the taking is necessary to such use;
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1241.

7334. (3592.) Right to enter to make survey, etc. Damage. In all
cases where land is required for public use, the person or corporation, or his
or its agents, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of
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104-61-3. Private Property Which May be
Taken.
The private property which may be taken
under this chapter includes:
(1) All real property belonging to any
person.
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any
county, city or incorporated town, not appropriated to some public use.
(3) Property appropriated to public use;
provided, that such property shall not be taken
unless for a more necessary public use than
that to which it has been already appropriated.
(4) Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges,
ferries, and all other franchises; provided, that
such franchises shall not be taken unless for
free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use.
(5) All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section 104-61-1, and any
and all structures and improvements thereon, and
the lands held or used in connection therewith,
shall be subject to be connected with, crossed or
intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon; they shall also be
subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses of
crossings, intersections and connections shall be
made in the manner most compatible with the
greatest public benefit and the least private injury.
(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public use when such .
taking is authorized by law. (C. L. 17, § 7332.)

104-61-4. Conditions Precedent to Taking.
Before property can be taken it must app e i r . >
(1) That the use to which it is to be ap
'plied is a use authorized by law;
(2) That the tajpng is necessary to such
use; and,
(3) If already appropriated to some public
use, that the public use to which it is to be
applied is a more necessary public use.
(C. L. 17, § 7333.)

Properly and franchises of private corporations subject to
eminent domain, Const. Art. 12, Sec 11.

104-61-7. Complaint—Contents.
The complaint must contain:
(1) The name of the corporatiogf
tion, commission or person in ctiaj
public use for which the property
who must be styled plaintiff.
(2) The names of all owners anT
of the property, if known, or a st~
they are unknown, who must bg"^
fendants.
(3) A statement of the right o
tiff.
(4) If a right of way is s o u |
plaint must show its location, geig
termini, and must be accompany
thereof, so far as the same is i ?
action or proceeding.
(5) A description of eaclT
sought to be taken, and whetl^
eludes the whole or only part $
eel or tract. All parcels ly%
and required for the same p*|

More necessary Public Use—S. L. C. Water & Electrical Power
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 25 U. 441, 71 P. 1067; Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. O. S. L. By. Co., 23 U. 474, 65 P. 735.
Joint use with owner as distinguished from dispossessing owner. Monetaire M. Co. v. Columbia Rexall Consolidated
Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172.
Interest Subject To—Contracts to purchase state lands. Brigham
City v. Rich, 34 U. 130, 97 P . 220, 4 A. L. R. 548.
Tax Lien. O. S. L. R. R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 TJ. 378, 126 P . 394.
Land already devoted to public use. Ketchum Coal Co. v.
Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 U. 394, 168 P. 86.
Easement on easement, proper. Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v.
Mooseman, 45 U. 79, 141 P . 459; Monetaire M. Co. v. Columbia Recall Consolidated Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P . 172.
Joint Use—Compensation and regulation prescribed according
to rules of equity. Monetaire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consolidated Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. See also:
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 U. 126,
121 P . 592.
Railroad right of way. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley
Coal Co., 50 U. 395, 168 P. 86. See also: Bingham & Garfield R. Co. v. No. Utah Mining Co. of Bingham, 49 U. 125,
162 P . 65.
.
Rights Reserved in Owner—Right of passage across railroad
track. Bingham & Garfield R. Co. v. No. Utah Mining Co.
of Bingham, 49 U. 125, 162 P. 65.
Title to Locus—Evidence of title in owner. Jordan v. Utah R.
Co., 47 U. 519, 156 P . 939.
Condemnor estopped to deny defendant's title. Ketchum Coal
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 U. 342,
159 P . 737.
Acquired by condemnor after suit commenced. Ketchum Coal
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 U. 342,
159 P . 737.

104-61-5. Right of Entry for Survey, etc.
In all cases where land is required for public
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such
use may survey and locate the same; but it
must be located in the manner which will be ^
most compatible with the greatest public good i
and the least private injury, and subject to $
the provisions of this chapter. The person, or
his agent, in charge of such public use may
enter upon the land and make examinations,
surveys and maps thereof, and such entry shali
constitute no cause of action in favor of the ]
owners of the lands, except for injuries result- !
ing from negligence, wantonness or malice.
(C. L. 17, §7334;
104-61-6. Venue of Action—Complaint to be|
Verified.
All proceedings under this chapter must be?
brought in the district court for the county ig£
which the property or some part thereof is siij
uated. The complaint in such cases must b£
verified.
(C. L. 17, § 7335§
Venue—Postal Tel Cable Co. v. O. S. L. R. Co., 23vtf. « § ,
65 P . 735.
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mental projects for improvement of Places of historical interest, eminent domain to preserve, 59 A. L. R. 945.
housing conditions (slum clearPublic benefit or convenience as distinance), 105 A. L. R. 911.
guished from use by the public as
Exercise of eminent domain for purpose
ground for exercise of eminent -doof increasing right or interest which
main, 54 A. L. R. 7.
etitioner already owns or relieving
tie property or petitioner of some Right to condemn property in excess of
needs for public purposes, 68 A. L.
burden or obligation in respect of
R. 837.
property, 108 A. L. R. 1522.
power of eminent domain as afExercise of eminent domain for purpose Statefected
by interstate (character of
of library, 66 A. L. R. 1496.
uses to which property taken is to be
Exercise of eminent domain for purposes
devoted,
90 A. L. R. 1082.
of airport, 135 A. L. R. 755.
Injunction against exercise of power of
eminent domain, 133 A. L. R. 11.
104-61-2. Estates and Rights that May Be Taken.
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands
subject to be taken for public use:
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit, of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the
reduction of ores; provided, that where surface ground is underlaid
with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify
extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface
ground over such deposits.
(2) An easement, when taken for any other use,
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, with the
right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as
may be necessary for some public use;
(L. 19, p. 346, § 7331.)
Codes, § 9935 (substantially identical,
History.
This section differs materially from 2 except that subd. 1 concludes with
Comp. Laws 1888, § 3842. Other prede- words: " * * * or tailings of a
cessor sections, see R. S. 1898, §3689; mine").
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3589,
1. Easements.
Comparable provisions.
In proceeding to condemn easement in
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, §1239 (classi- land for laying of gas pipe line, taking
fies estates and rights in lands subject of easement was held not to constitute
to be taken for a public use; subd. 1 is taking of fee. Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouidentical through the words "tailings of whuis, 82 U. 673, 26 P.2d 648.
a mine"; pertains also to protection of
One easement may be superimposed on
water bearing lands from drought, and another easement through condemnation..
to taking of property by mutual water Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Rexall
system or water district or other pol- Consol. Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172.
itical subdivision; subd. 2 includes idenRight to run water through defendtical provision as herein, but is coupled ants' irrigation canal might be conwith lengthy proviso; subd. 8 is substan- demned, although defendants had only
tially identical with subd. 3 herein).
easement. Whiterocks I r r . Co. v. MooseIdaho Code, § 13-702, Mont. Rev. man, 46 U. 79, 141 P. 459.

S

104-61-3. Private Property Which May Be Taken.
The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes:
(1) All real property belonging to any person.
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated town, not appropriated to some public use.
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(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than
that to which it has been already appropriated.
(4) Franchises for toil roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for
free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use.
(5) All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section
104-61-1, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and
the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be
connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited
use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such
uses of crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the
manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least
private injury.
"(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for
public use when such taking is authorized by law. (C. L. 17, § 7332.)
History.
This section is practically identical
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3848. Other
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898,
§ 3690; Comp. Laws 1907, § 3690.
Comparable provisions.
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1240 (designating private property which may be
taken under title pertaining to Eminent
Domain).
Idaho Code, § 13-703, Mont. Rev.
Codes, § 9936 (substantially the same).
Cross-references.
Property and franchises of private
corporations subject to eminent domain,
Const. Art. XII, § 11.
1. Public lands.
Under Const. Art. I l l , § 2, and section
3 of Enabling Act, by which the people
forever disclaimed all right and title to
unappropriated public lands lying within
boundaries thereof, public lands are not
subject to state power of eminent domain
either directly or indirectly, without consent of United States. Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 230 F. 328,
337, 4 A. L. R. 635.
2. Land granted by Congress for railroad rights of way.
Under subdivision
(6), sxiflteient
ground for a tipple site may be condemned, but a coal company cannot con*
demn any portion of a right of way, used
for railroad purposes and granted by
Congress, for a tipple site, regardless of
how convenient that would be, and even
though it would indirectly benefit the
nublic. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant
Valley Coal Co., 50 U. 395, 168 P. 86.
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3. Property appropriated to public use
in general.
Generally, property which is being
held for or devoted to public use by one
erson may not be taken by another to
e used for same purpose and in the
same manner.
Utah Copper Co. v,
Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 U. 645,
31 P.2d 624.
Property devoted to one public use
may, under general statutory authority,
be taken for another public use, where
taking will not materially impair or interfere with, or is not inconsistent with,
USB already existing. Freeman Gulch
Min. Co, v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119
F.2d 16.

E

4. More necessary public use.
__
Proceeding by power company to obtain right to connect flume with city's
canal for purpose of discharging water
into it was not suit to condemn land belonging to city as it owned only easement
over land, and hence it waB not necessary to show that use by power company
was more necessary public use than that
by city. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co. v. Salt Lake City, 26
U. 441, 71 P. 1067.
Land, which is part of railroad's right
of way but is not used for any purpose
and is not essential to enjoyment of railroad's franchise and property, may be
appropriated to use of duly incorporated
telegraph company for purpose of constructing and maintaining its lines, since
such appropriation is for more necessary
public use. Postal Tel. Cable Co. of
Utah v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 23 U.
474, 66 P . 735, 90 Am. St. Rep. 705.

104-61-4
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5. Joint use o r use in common.
Where tunnel was not used by owner
and possessor thereof to its full capacity, right to joint use of tunnel could
be condemned upon proper compensation
being made to owner. Monetaire Mln.
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consoi. Mines
Co.. 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. (Corfman
and McCarty, JJ., dissenting.)
Subdivision (5) limits the interference
with rights of way to "crossings, intersections, and connections" by other
rights of way, and also makes a right
of way subject "to a limited use in common with the owners thereof," although
such use is clearly and manifestly a
use for which the original right of way
was obtained and is being used, and no
other. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant
Valley Coal Co., 60 U. 895, 168 P. 86.
Proceeding by city against irrigation
company to obtain right to enlarge irrigating canal owned by defendant BO
as to convey water from river for use
of its inhabitants was controlled by
principles involved in exercise of right
of eminent domain. Salt Lake City v.
East Jordan Irr. Co., 40 U. 126, 121 P .
6. Interest in land of person contracting to purchase from Htate.
In proceedings by city to condemn
against one in possession of land under
contract to purchase from state title to
which was in United States, where pending the proceedings defendant In possession assigned his right in land to corporation of which he was president and
director, which received patent therefor
from state and was afterwards made
party to proceedings, held original defendant had interest in land when proceedings were commenced which was
subject to condemnation and was same
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interest which passed to defendant corporation and ripened into title relating
back to contract of sale by state. Brigham City v. Rich, 34 U. 130, 96 P . 220.
7. Effect, on rights of owner, of condemnation of easement.
Use of land condemned for railroad
right of way for exclusive use permanent in its nature precludes owner from
entering on or UBing any part of land,
except by condemnor's consent, or unless statute or court limits easement by
reserving certain rights to owner. Bingham & G. Ry. Co. v. North Utah Min.
Co. of Bingham, 49 U. 125,' 162 P. 65.
A. L. R. noteB.
Capital stock of public utility, condemnation. 81 A. L. R. 1071.
Dower rights, condemnation, B A. L. R.
1847.
Property previously condemned or purchased for public use but not actually so used, right to condemn, 12
A. L. R. 1502.
Property to be exchanged for other
property required for public use,
power to condemn, 68 A. L. R. 442.
Public property, taking for another public purpose, right to compensation,
56 A.- L R. 365.
Right of municipality or other governmental body seeking to acquire public utility to proceed in the manner
prescribed generally for exercise of
eminent domain, 109 A. L. R. 384.
Right to take property under eminent
domain as affected by fact that
property is already devoted to cemetery purposes, 109 A. L. R. 150Z.
State power of eminent domain over
property of United States, 4 A. L.

104-61-4. Conditions Precedent to Taking.
Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by
law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; and,
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, t h a t the public use
to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use,
(C. L. 17, § 7338.)
History.
This section is practically identical
with 2 Comp. LaWB 1888, § 3844. Other
redecessor sections, see R. S. 1898,
3591; Comp. LawB 1907, §3591.

S

Comparable provisions.
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1241 (subd. 1
is identical with Bubd. 1 herein; subds.
2 and 3 are prefaced with language

identical with subds. 2 and 3, respectively, herein, but are coupled with
lengthy provisos).
Idaho Code, § 13-704 (identical).
Mont. Rev. Codes, §9937 (identical,
except that Bubd. 3 is coupled with provision specifying that appeal to supreme
court is permissible from finding or
judgment, but such appeal does not stay
further proceedings under this chapter).
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1. More necessary public use.
Proceeding by power company to obtain right to connect flume with city's
canal for purpose of discharging water
into it was not suit to condemn land
belonging to city as it owned only easement over land, and hence it WBB not
necessary to show that use by power
company was more necessary public use
than that by city. Salt Lake City Water
& Electrical Power Co.
Salt Lake
City, 26 U. 441, 71 P. 1067.

104-61-7

A. L. R. notes.
Necessity of taking particular property for drainage purposes as affecting
exercise of eminent domain, 65 A. L.
R. 604; property previously condemned
or purchased for public use but not actually so used, right to condemn, 12 A.
L. R. 1502; right to condemn property
in excess of needs for public purposes,
68 A. L. R. 837; right to take property
under eminent domain as affected by
fact that property is already devoted to
"cemetery purposes, 109 A. L. R. 1602.

104-61-5. Right of E n t r y for Survey, etc.
In all cases where land is required for public use, the person, or his
agent, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury, and subject to the
provisions of this chapter. The person, or his agent, in .charge of such
public use may enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys
and maps thereof, and such entry shall constitute no cause of action in
favor of the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting from
(C. L. 17, § 7334.)
negligence, wantonness or malice.
History.
.
This section is practically identical
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3845. Other
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898,
§ 3592; Comp. LawB 1907, § 3592.

Comparable provisions.
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, §1242, Idaho
Code, § 13-705, Mont. Rev. Codes, § 9938
(substantially identical, reading in part:
*' * * * the state, or itB agents in
charge of such UBS * * * " ) .

104-61-6. Venue of Action—Complaint to Be Verified.
All proceedings Under this chapter must be brought in the district
court for the county in which the property or some p a r t thereof is situated. The complaint in such cases must be verified. (C. L. 17, § 7835.)
History.
, ,
This section is practically identical
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3846. Other
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898,
| 3693; Comp. Laws 1907, § 3593.
Comparable provisions.
Cal. Civil Proc. Code. § 1243 (includes
rovision similar to firBt sentence herein;
eBignating "superior court").
Idaho Code, §13-706 (similar to first
sentence herein; " * * * for the county
in which the property is Bituated").

S

Mont. Rev. Codes, § 9939, as amended
by Laws of 1987 (includes provision
identical with first sentence herein).
1.

Constitutionality.
This section does not conflict with
ConBt. Art, VIII, § 5, so as to preclude
telegraph company from bringing action to condemn railroad's right of way,
which extends through several counties,
for construction of its lines, in one of
such counties. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 23 U. 474,
65 P. 736, 90 Am. St. Rep, 705.

104-61-7. Complaint—Contents..
The complaint must contain:
(1) The name of the corporation, association, commission or person
in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must
be styled plaintiff.
(2) The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if
known, or a statement t h a t they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
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104-34-3

ndeinner

and the owner of land within said limit and providing for
operation
of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of
e
^eg; nor until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the
^ration of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores.
Construction and application of section.
— irrigation.
/Under Const. Art. I, § 22, and 1&-7-4,
Tier of water right is entitled to: just
^npensation for rights taken; he is enled to have value of his land considered
connection with his water : - right,
jtnird City v. State, 105 U. 278, 288,
^P.2d 154, 158.
— extra-territorial powers of condemnation.
J This section does not, by implication,
infer extra-territorial powers of conemnation upon boards of education,
ertagnoli v. Baker, — U. —, 215 P.2d

pliedly confer extra-territorial powers
of condemnation upon boards of education. Bertagnoli v. Baker, —• U. —, 215
P.2d 626.
. . ' . . . . '
4. —water system of public utility.
By the terms of former 104-61-1 and
15-7-4, town of North Salt Lake had
authority to condemn water system for
use of its inhabitants even though property belonged to company which was furnishing public service. North Salt Lake
v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., — U. —,
223 P.2d 577.

A. L. R. notes.
Compensation for, or extent of rights acquired by, taking of land, as affected
by condemnor's promissory stateIn proceedings for an alternative writ
ments as to character of use or unprohibition directing court, judges
dertakings to be performed by it, 7
hereof, and school board, to refrain
A. L. R. 2d 1407.
* om any further proceedings in condem- Condemnation of materials for highway
nation action, enactment of 75-11-26 by
or other public, or quasi-public
legislature led to conclusion that legisworks, 172 A. L. R. 131.
lature, by its silence in this section and Condemnation of public utility property
5-11-20, both of which were enacted
for public utility purposes, 173 A.
rior to 75-11-26, did not intend to imL. R. 1362.

^4-34-2. Estates and Rights that May be Taken.
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use:
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for
aanent buildings, for res^voirs and dams and permanent flooding
,. asioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit
f debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduc|oxi of ores; provided that where surface ground is underlaid with
^aerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extracM, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground
^er such deposits.
(2) An easement, when taken for any other use.
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, with the right
*take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be
essary for some public use.
-4-34-3. Private Property Which May Be Taken.
The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes:
(1) All real property belonging to any person.
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorpo;^d town, not appropriated to some public use.
,(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such propshall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that
^hich it has been already appropriated.
123
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(4) Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges* ferries, and all other •
chises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless fo/f^I
highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use.
*^_
• (5) All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in sectio 1 3
hereof, and any and all structures a n d improvements thereon, and fl! 4 ^
lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be c 4'l§
nected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or imprn°^ ?L
ment or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited use ^A
common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses ^ t ^
crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the mannS3H
most.compatible with t h e greatest public benefit a,nd the least privatS ^
injury.
• . «•
" -Jf&ia
(6) Allclasses of private property not enumerated may be taken jljPli
public use when such taking is authorized b y law.
J ^
A. L. R. notes.
Retention, by building or other
fixture,
.... of; its character as real property,
.for purposes of statute authorizing

., condemnation, of real property noiPt
.withstanding agreement treating ^W
. as. personalty,. 151 A. L. R.142^-Sjt
" •;.
'n*%i

104-34-4. Conditions Precedent to T a k i n g

W\

Before property can be taken it must a.ppp^r: . V . .
(1) That the use to which i t is t o Jbe applied is a use authorized ^ | |
law

;

•

V;.r;_;.;\. •

:?

ffk

(2) That t h e taking is necessary t o siicKjiSe; and,
. : ^
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use4|^
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
<f§
104-34-5; Right of E n t r y f6r Stitveyy ^etci:
r-^fit
In all;ca,se$ where land is reqpired-fpr pjiblic!use, the person, or li
agent* in charge pf such u s e m a y ^ u r y e y anctlocate tjie same; but it m:|
be located in the manner which yriU be.^pgt s cpi^ipatible with the greatg
public good and the least private..wj|^^\and/js\iibj.^_to%e provision
Of this chapter. The person, or his agent, iii charge of such public w
may enter upon the land : and .make examiiiatioiis, surveys and maj]
thereof, and such entry shall^ constitiite.no cause of action in favors
the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting froih negligei^
wantonness or malice.
..
,
104-34-6.

Complaint—Contents.

The complaint must contain:
(1) The name of the corporation, association, commission or P e r ?£|
in charge of the public itse for which the property is sought, who mi
be styled plaintiff<
^ ! .-••.
(2) The names of all owners-and claimants of t h e property, if fof
o r a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled d e f e n d
(3) A statement of t h e right of t h e plaintiff.
^ .<:.
(4) If a right of way is sought; t h e complaint must show its tocat^
general route and termini* a n d must be accompanied by a map ther
so far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding.
124
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Chs. 57, 58

Judicial Code

[150]

beer as defined herein, properly completed, signed and filed as prescribed
herein and any regulation issued by the governing authorities concerning the issuance and use of said identification card, shall be prima facie
evidence of good faith of any action brought against any store manager
or his employees, any proprietor of a package agency or his employees,
or any licensee to sell beer at retail or his employees for sale of liquor
or beer, as the case may be, to any person signing such identification
card. No holder of such identification card properly completed, signed
and filed as in this act provided shall be prosecuted criminally or sued
in any civil action for selling liquor or beer to a person under 21 years of
age who has presented such identification card at the time of purchase
and delivered same for filing as herein provided.
Section 7. Misdemeanor—Penalty.
Any person who shall make any false statement on the identification
card provided for in this act to be signed by him, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor; on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of
not more than $100.00 or imprisonment for not more than thirty days
or by both.
Approved March 3, 1951.

[151]

Ch. 58

amended, and Chapters 19, 38 and 34, Laws of Utah 1943; Chapters 8
and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1949,
insofar as the same have not been superseded by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, are hereby
revised, codified and re-enacted into law as "The Judicial Code" under
Title 104, as follows:
TITLE 104
JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. COURTS
CHAPTER 1.

ENUMERATION

104-1-1. Courts of Justice Enumerated.
The following are the courts of justice of this state:
(1) The senate sitting as court of impeachment.
(2) The Supreme court.
(3) The district courts.
(4) The city courts.
(5) The juvenile courts.
(6) Justices' courts.
104-1-2. Courts of Record Enumerated.
The courts enumerated in the first five subdivisions of the preceding
section are courts of record.

JUDICIAL CODE
H. B. No. 31

Judicial Code

CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT

Passed March 8, 1951. In efftct May 8, 1951.

CHAPTER 58
A COMPILATION
An Act to Revise, Codify and Re-enact Into Law Under Title 104 all of
Those Sections of Title 20, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Known as
"Courts," and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Known as the
"Code of Civil Procedure/* and all Subsequent Acts Amendatory
Thereof or Supplemental Thereto, Including Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21,
33, 34, 35, 36 Laws of Utah 1943; Chapters 25, 26, 39 and 40, Laws
of Utah 1945; Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11 and 31, Laws of Utah 1947, and
Chapters 17, 26 and 76, Laws of Utah 1949, Which Have Not Been
Superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Adopted by the
Supreme Court of Utah, Said New Enactment to be Known as "The
Judicial Code"; Also Adding Thereto Necessary Sections to Carry
Into Effect Said Enactment Without Affecting Existing Rights or
Obligations; Also Repealing Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 1943, A s Amended, and Chapters 19, 33 and 34, Laws of Utah
1943; Chapters 8 and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and Chapter 76, Laws
of Utah 1949.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as

104-2-1.

Number of Justices—Quorum—Term.

The supreme court shall consist of five justices, three of whom shall
constitute a quorum to hold court or render a decision, but one alone
may adjourn from day to day. The term of office of a justice of the
supreme court shall be ten years and until his successor is elected and
qualified.
104-2-2.

Jurisdiction—Original and Appellate.

The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to
any part of the state, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in
actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself or
the supreme court, or before any district court or judge thereof. In
other cases the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction only;
and, in the exercise of such appellate jurisdiction, may review all final
judgments of the district court, and all final orders and decrees of the
district court in the administration of decedents' estates and in matters
of guardianship, and shall have power to issue writs necessary and
proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction. In equity cases the appeal
may be.on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal
shall be on questions of law alone.
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78-34-3

EMINENT DOMAIN

JUDICIAL CODE

Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Eexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P, 172,
I n proceeding to condemn easement in
land for laying of gas pipe line, t a k i n g

of easement was held not to constitute
taking of fee. Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhuis, 82 U. 573, 26 P . 2d 548.

78-34-3. Private property which may be taken.—The private property
which may be taken under this chapter includes:
(1) All real property belonging to any person.
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated
town, not appropriated to some public use.
(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to
which it has been already appropriated.
(4)' Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other
franchises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for
free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use.
(5) Air rights-of-way for any and all purposes mentioned in section
78-34-1 hereof, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and
the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject t.o be
connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right-of-way. or
improvement or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited
use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses
of crossings, intersections and connections shall, be made in the manner
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private
injury.
(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for
public use when such taking is authorized by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-3.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is substantially the same
1
,"
n4.i^
i n / l R 1 o //indA iQ4<n
as former ^ ^ J 0 ^ 1 ' *
<°0!^ n 1 9 4 ° >
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch.
The reference in this section to " s e c
tion 78-34-1" appeared in the act as
section l.
Comparable* ^ v i M o n s .
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Oode, & ±<av
(designating private property which may
be taken under title pertaining to Emment Domain).
Idaho Code 1947, §7-703; Mont. Bev.
Codes 1947, § 93-9904 (substantially the
same).
Cross-Reference.
Property and franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain,
Const. Art. X I I , § 11.

Capital stock of public utility, condemnation, 81 A. L. B. 1071.
Dower rights, condemnation, 5 A. L. K.
1347.
^ P 6 * * P r £ ? o u s ^ ™?demfnQe*
° ' *™'
chased for public use but not actually so
d rf h t * , condemn, 12 A. L. B. 1502.
p r ' o p e * t y t o b e exchanged for other
P'opertv required for public use, power
^ ^ t ^ ^ 9 \ ^ t ,
another
public purpose, right to compensation, 56
% e t J t l o n ? by building or other fixture,
o £ i t g character a s r e a i property, for purg o f g t a t u t e authorizing condemnation
o f r e a l p r o p e r t y | notwithstanding agrcem e l l t treating it as personalty, 151 A. L.
R

U 2 9

'Right
mental
utility
scribed
domain,
Bight
domain

DECISIONS TINDER F O B M E B LAW
1.

Public lands.
Under Const. Art. H I , § 2, and section
3 of Enabling Act, by which the people
forever disclaimed all right and title to
unappropriated public lands lying within
boundaries thereof, public lands are not
subject to state power of eminent domain
either directly or indirectly, without consent of United States. Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 230 F . 328,
337. 4 A. L. B. 535.
2.

Land granted by Congress for railroad rights-of-way.
Under subdivision (5), sufficient ground
for a tipple site may be condemned, but
a coal company cannot condemn any portion of a right-of-way, used for railroad
purposes and granted by Congress, for
a tipple site, regardless of how convenient
t h a t would be, and even though it would
indirectly benefit the public. Ketchum
Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50
U. 395, 168 P . 86.
3.

Property appropriated to public use
in general.
Property devoted to one public use
may, under general statutory authority,
be t a k e n for another public use, where
t a k i n g will not materially impair or interfere with, or is not inconsistent with,
use already existing. Freeman G-ulch Min.
Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 F .
2d 16.
Generally, property which is being held
for or devoted to public use by one person may not be taken by another to be
used for same purpose and in the same
manner. Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen
Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 U. 546, 31 P . 2d
624.
4.

Necessity for public use.
Land, which is p a r t of railroad's rightof-way but is not used for any purpose
and is not essential to enjoyment of railroad's franchise and property, may be
appropriated to use of duly incorporated
telegraph company for purpose of constructing and maintaining its lines, since
such appropriation is for more necessary
public use. Postal Tel, Cable Co. of Utah
v. Oregon Short Line B . Co., 23 U. 474,
65 P . 735, 90 Am. St. Bep. 705. .,':
of municipality or other governProceeding by power company to obbody 'seeking to acquire public
tain right to connect flume with city's
canal for purpose of discharging water
to proceed in the manner preinto it was not suit to condemn land begenerally for exercise of eminent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Lawlonging
School, BYU.
to city as it owned only easement
109 A, L. B. 384.
over land, and hence it was not necesMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to take property under eminent
BOTV +n n h n w flint. TIHP htr -nnwAT
nnm-nartxr
as affected by fact that property

trical Power Co. v. Sa
U. 441, 71 P . 1067.
5.

Joint or use in conn
Proceeding by city i
company to obtain righ
gating canal owned by
to convey water from ri
inhabitants was control
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78-34-4, Conditions precedent to taking.—Before property can be taken
it must appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law ;
(2) That the taking is necessary to such usej and,
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-4.
Compiler's Note,
This section is substantially the same
as former section 104-61-4 (Code 1943)
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch.
58, § 3 .
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 1241
(subd. 1 is identical with Bubd. 1 herein;
subds. 2 and 3 are prefaced with language
identical with subds, 2 and 3, respectively, herein, b u t are coupled with lengthy
provisos).
Idaho Code 1947, §7-704 (identical).
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §93-9905
(identical, except t h a t subd. 3 is coupled
with provision specifying t h a t appeal to
Supreme Court is permissible from finding or judgment, b u t such appeal does
not stay further proceedings under this
chapter).

Collateral References.
Eminent Domain<S=>13.
29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 29.
Conditions precedent, 18 Am. Jur, 961,
Eminent Domain § 317 et seq.
Necessity of t a k i n g particular property for drainage purposes as affecting
exercise of eminent domain, 65 A. L. K.
504.
Property previously condemned or purchased for public use but not actually
so used, right to condemn, 12 A. L. R,
1502.
Right to condemn property in excess
of needs for public purposes, 68 A. L. R.
837.
Right to t a k e property under eminent
domain as affected by fact t h a t - p r o p e r t y
is already devoted to cemetery purposes,
109 A. L. R. 1502.

'DECISION UNDER FORMER L A W
1,

More necessary public use,
Proceeding by power company to ob
tain right to connect flume with city's
canal for purpose of discharging water
into it was not suit to condemn land
belonging to city as it owned only ease-

ment over land, and hence it was not
necessary to show t h a t use by power
company was more necessary public use
than that by city. Salt Lake City Water
& Electrical Power Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 25 TJ. 441, 71 P . 1067.

78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location.—In all cases where
land is required for public use, the person, or his agent, in charge of
such use may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in the
manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter.
The person, or his agent, in charge of such public use may enter upon
the land and make examinations, surveys and maps thereof, and such
entry shall constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the
lands, except for injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness or malice.
History: L. 1&51, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-5.
Compiler's Note.
This section is substantially the same
as former section 104-61-5 (Code 1943)
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch.
58, § 3 .

Idaho Code 1947, §7-705; Mont. Rev.
Codes 1947, § 93-9906 (substantially identical, reading in p a r t : "* * * t h e state,
or its agents in charge
of
such
use
").
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property t h a t has not been devoted by law to a
public use.
By the Court: The objection is overruled
Exception.
A. There is very little of the property adjoining ours between these points under cultivation, and along a great, majority of it it is public
land, and there is a wagon road between the two
points practically parallel to our right of way
and not very far away at any place.
Q. A t any portion of this road over this
route, you may state if you know whether or not
t h e wagon road or highway or the railroad is the
more, direct, as, for instance, toward the northern end?
A. As a. whole proposition, I think the
wia.gon road is the shorter; I . know it is in a
gre»at many places.
Q. Can you refer to any particular locality
in which there is an economy of distance by
t h e wagon road? ,
A. For a distance of thirty miles south of
t h e Montana line, about three or four miles,
t h r e e miles, at least, would be saved by going
across t h e mountain by t h e wagon- road.
Q. The railroad there makes detours, then,
for some reason. Why is t h a t ?

A. For the purpose of supporting a uniform, grade.
Q. I will ask you to state, Mr. Calvin, from
your experience and observation and knowledge •
of such matters, and from t h e description of the
proposed line of telegraph poles t h a t you. heard
here in Court this morning, and t h a t is described
in t h e petition, whether it would be an interference and annoyance and an added danger, in
/
your opinion, to the operation of the railroad,
to have such a line erected as it is proposed to
erect it, at a distance of thirty feet from t h e
railroad t r a c k ?
By Mr. Powers: I object to t h e question
as incompetent, calling for conclusions and opinions upon a hypothetical statement t h a t it is
altogether too indefinite; t h e opinions sought
would be of no value.
Overruled. Exception.
A. Certainly.
. • ,
Q. How much, in your opinion, if you are
able to give one, would the right of way, or t h e
value of the right of way of the railroad, be impaired or lessened in value by t h e presence of a
line of telegraph as proposed, as compared with
its value for railroad purposes, without such
construction?
By Mr. Powers: The question'of damages

^
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is not at issue in this ease, and this testimony is
therefore incompetent, .immaterial and irrelevant.
By the Court: Objection is overruled.
Exception.
By Mr. Powers: And let the objection
stand to any testimony upon these questions, so
I need, not renew it.
A. I should say it should not be done at
all. But t h e damage would be not less t h a n
|200 per mile; there are other contingencies t h a t
Q. I wish you would state, Mr. Calvin,
some of the reasons and as many as may occur
to you, briefly, upon which you base this opinion
and judgment, and the objection which you find
to such.construction?
A. W e burn off our right of way once a
year. At such times it is necessary t o have a
force of men on hand to prevent, the burning of
telegraph poles and right of way fence posts.
I t is necessary to have a force of men on hand
to travel -with the fire and be stationed at each
telegraph pole to beat it out. W i t h another
line t h a t expense would be doubled. W e have
accidents which make it necessary to move
poles. W e have accidents which knock poles
down. W e have fires t h a t are set by accident
when there is no one around, which would burn

up such property. W e are now engaged in widening the embankment of our roadbed through
this portion of t h e line t h a t is in controversy. I t
will not all be done this year, but it is all provided for in our appropriation for t h e immediate future for a large portion of the district, t h a t
would be covered by this line. There is no soil
excepting pockets in t h e lava. W e have to scrape
around for a distance of three or four hundred
feet from t h e track on each side in order to get
sufficient material to accomplish that. The further we haul t h a t material the more we have to
pay for it. If a telegraph line or anything else
intervenes, it means added distance. Then there
is an element of danger; t h e poles and wires being blown on to the track and material of t h a t
kind being left lying on t h e right of way, which
is liable to cause personal injury.
Q. Do you know of any other reason at
this time? You may state whether or not, in
your opinion, the presence, from time to time
and at all times, of the material t h a t might be
necessary t ^ t h e employees of such a company
in maintaining a line there, left at their pleasure and convenience upon the right of way,
would, in your opinion, be,a liability of resulting in additional danger, in t h e operation of a
railroad safely?
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A. Without, doubt. Then another item of
added expense would be t h a t if this line, as proposed, be placed thirty feet from the track, it
would fill a large portion of the territory inside
of our line, where we run along a stream, where
it would be impracticable to place it on the
opposite side. In case of our stringing additional wires, which is necessary from time to
time, we couldn't, under these circumstances,
handle t h e wire from the track on account of the
interevning pole lines. It would be necessary to
put. it on wagons and haul it over the country
for stringing it. On portions of this.road, it
would be an absolute necessity to place both of
those lines on t h e same side of t h e track, for the
reason t h a t t h e road runs along streams where
it is impracticable to get on t h e other side, and
certainly impossible without getting too close to
t h e track. Under such conditions wliere it becomes necessary for us to string another wire,
we couldn't handle t h a t wire from a car on the
track, as is our practice, but it would be necessary to haul it in a wagon on the other side of
t h e pole line.
Q. You speak of accidents, wrecks, etc.,
when it becomes necessary, sometimes, to remove t h e poles. I would be obliged if you would
go a. little more into detail upon t h a t subject,

t h e occasional wreck you speak of, which does
occur now and them
A. Well, it is necessary at almost every
wreck t h a t occurs along a railroad to string out
rope a long distance in order to right up t h e cars
and engines. There is w h a t we call a "dead
m a n " placed 25 or 50 feet on t h e opposite side
of t h e track from t h e engine; we put up a block
and tackle, attach it to the "dead m a n " down
the track and attach it to an engine. And we
very frequently are obliged to remove poles on
t h a t account.
Q. Under such circumstances would it be
practicable in the speedy removal of wrecks to
wait, the permission from another company to
interfere with their poles where it becomes
necessary on such occasions as you have indicated?
A. Certainly, no.
Q. The clearing up o-f 'a. wreck and getting
traffic started is something you work at every
moment, is it not, whether it is night or day?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether you know whether or not
t h e r e are objections, and the reason for the objection of telegraph wires across overhead of a
railroad track?
A. There are. W e are arranging now for
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all of our wires to go underground where tliey
cross the track. W e have done so in one case
as an experiment, and are arranging now to
make t h a t the standard.
Q.

I will ask you now whether or not you

have made estimates and orders for such crossings?
A. We have made requisitions for t h e requi site m aterial.
Q. You may state whether or not you
know it is the design of the company ^ e x t e n d
t h a t method hereafter, to renew the crossings
and make new crossings, to resort to crossings
underneath the track, instead of over?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.

What, are the objections to overhead

crossings?
jf
A. The danger of sagging wires is the
principal objection. When a wire becomes detached, from the pole nearest the railroad, it may
drop down a long distance below where it was
originally put; and it may do t h a t without being
detached.
Q. Where a wire becomes detached, the
greater will be the sag?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
Have you in your mind the length of
road from Cannon to Monida?

A. 202 miles.
Q. Are you able to state from your inspection of the surveys t h e distance in each of those
four counties?
A. I couldn't, give it exactly. I remember
approximately the distance, but not exactly.
CROSS

EXAMINATION.

By Mr. Mcintosh:
Q. W h a t is the distance, Mr. Calvin, of the
poles of the Western Union line, on your right of
wiay, from the roadbed?
A. Generally 50 feet, and in some places
more t h a n that.
Q. Some places nearer, are they not?
A. In a few places where t h e condition
of t h e adjacent country make it absolutely
necessary.
Q. Do you know the distance, t h e average
distance, from t h e center of t h e track to t h e
telegraph poles on the right of way of railroads
through t h e country?
A. In a general way, yes.
Q. W h a t is it?
A. I presume t h e average would be on the
old lines perhaps thirty feet, but on t h e new lines
it is not less t h a n fifty feet.
Q. Well, where the right of way is only

n'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

